THE "KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER" RULE OF THE
NYSE: LIABILITY OF BROKER-DEALERS
UNDER THE UCC AND FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
One of the most serious problems confronting the securities exchange markets is the high frequency with which fraudulent schemes
of customers ("customers' fraud")1 are effectuated through broker1. Report of the Special Study of the Securities Market of the S.E.C., H.1L
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 242-90 (1963); Study of Unsafe and
Unsound Practices of Brokers and Dealers: Report and Recommendations of the
S.E.C., H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., 145-50 (1971); Note, Insecure
Securities: Theft of Stocks and Bonds, 6 COLUm. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 478 (1970).
For the purposes of this Comment, the problem of customers' fraud in the
national securities exchanges will be broken down into two parts and analyzed
accordingly: (1) the "source of funds" problem, where a customer purchases securities through a stock exchange broker with funds which have been misappropriated from their rightful owner, and (2) the "stolen securities" problem, where a
customer sells stolen or misappropriated securities through a stock exchange broker.
See Brodsky, Brokers' Duty to 'Know' Customer and the Source of His Funds,
pt. I, N.Y.L.J, Dec. 20, 1972, at 1, col. 1. See text accompanying notes 12-13 infra.
HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS
COMMENT:
Report of the Special Study of the Securities Market of the S.E.C., H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study];
A. BROMBERo, SEcunrmas LAW: FRAUD-SEC RuLE lOb-5 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as BROMBERG];
L. Loss, SE urTrs REGULATiON (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss];
Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Bucklo);
Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to Its Customer for Violation of a
Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORD. L. REv. 253 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Hoblin];
Jacobs, The Impact of the Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on BrokerDealers,57 CORNELL L. REv. 869 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs];
Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 12 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities];
Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE
LJ. 1125 [hereinafter cited as Ruder & Cross];
Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action
Under the Exchange Act; Authority of the Administrative Agency To Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. Ran. L. Rnv. 925
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Shipman];
Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of
Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CAiF. L. REv. 1120 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Wolfson
& Russo];
Note, Insecure Securities: Theft of Stocks and Bonds, 6 COLuM. 3. OF L. &
Soc. PROB. 478 (1970) hereinafter cited as Insecure Securities].
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dealers. Every year, by estimate, millions of dollars are lost as a re-

sult of the carelessness of broker-dealers in failing to discover that
their customers were trading with securities or funds which have been
misappropriated or stolen from their rightful owners.' The New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as well as the smaller national exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),

have instituted various rules in an attempt to force member brokerdealers' to conduct investigations of customers prior to trading in
2. Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices, supra note 1, at 145; Insecure
Securities 478. Customers' fraud in the national exchanges has increased dramatically in the last ten years and there is substantial evidence that the incidence of
customer fraud will continue to increase in the years to come. The problem of
theft of securities, for example, took on especially serious dimensions in the late
1960's. Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices,supra at 145; Insecure Securities
478. Furthermore, in 1970 alone, twenty million dollars was lost through the
theft of securities and great sums of money were lost through customer embezzlement of funds to buy securities. There is substantial evidence, finally, that organized crime has infiltrated the securities industry--especially the New York
Stock Exchange-and made tremendous profits from customers' fraud. See Insecure Securities 478-80; President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Report-The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 192-95
(1967). Indeed, the New York Stock Exchange is so concerned about this problem that all employees of member firms must be investigated and fingerprinted
and considerable thought has been given to designing methods to prevent thefts
of certificates and funds within member firms. See Study of Unsafe and Unsound
Practices,supra note 1, at 14045; Insecure Securities 485-95.
An interesting reference to the magnitude and complexity of securities transactions in recent years in the national exchange markets and the resultant vulnerability of securities owners to losses due to customers' fraud appears in United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 10 UCC REP. SERv. 759 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1972). In that case, securities were stolen from W.E. Hutton & Company, a stockbroker, and fraudulently indorsed by means of Hutton's facsimile signature machine. The transfer of registration of the securities was consummated ultimately
by the issuer and its transfer agents. Hutton later sued the issuer and transfer
agent for conversion. In considering whether or not Hutton had notified the
defendants of the loss within a "reasonable time," as required by UCC § 8-405
(see note 89 infra), the court noted:
It is admitted that Hutton [original owner] did not know that the stock
certificates in question were stolen or missing until long after the fact.
They did not become aware of the loss until informed by the law enforcement officials investigating crimes involving stolen securities. Plaintiff admits that in these heavy trading years no one in the industry
knew where anything was. It was not until long after the consummation
of the alleged conversions complained of here that plaintiff notified the
defendants of the theft. Id. at 766.
3. A "broker" is defined in section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in
securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(4)(1970). A "dealer" is defined as "any person engaged in the
business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or
otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells
securities for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity,
but not as a part of a regular business." Id. § 78c(a)(5). The "know your cus-
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the securities markets on their behalf.4 Most potent among these
regulations is rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange-the
"know your customer" rule-which requires every NYSE member
to use "due diligence" to learn the "essential facts" relative to every
customer, order and account carried by the member firm.5 Despite
the existence of rule 405 and the analogous rules of other self-regulatory agencies, however, the problem of customers' fraud in securities transactions negotiated through members of the national exchanges remains a serious threat to the adequate protection of
the investing public.
The purpose of this Comment is, first, to analyze the nature of
the problem of customers' fraud in the securities exchange markets
and evaluate the need and policy justifications for imposing on the
broker a customer-investigation duty of due care which is redressable civilly by the rightful owners of misappropriated securities or
funds. The Comment will then stress the importance of requiring

the centralized management of brokerage firms to maintain and enforce effective supervisory controls over their local registered repre-

sentatives. Finally, the Comment will discuss the relative merits of
the major remedies that are available against NYSE broker-dealers
tomer" duties discussed in this Comment apply to New York Stock Exchange members and member firms, which include both "brokers" and "dealers." See notes
62-63 infra and accompanying text. Consequently, the distinction between
"broker" and "dealer" will not generally be maintained throughout the remainder
of the Comment, and both definitions will be subsumed under the general title of
"broker."
4. See New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK
ExcH. GurmE
2405 (1972). Other self-regulatory bodies under the Exchange
Act have similar "know your customer" and broker-supervision rules. See, e.g.,
American Stock Exchange Rule 411, reprinted in 2 CCH AM. STOCK ExCH. GumB
9431; Section 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), reprinted in CCH NASD DEALERs AN'uAL
2177
(1967). These rules are analogous also to SEC rule 15b10-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.
15b10-4 (1972), promulgated for SEC regulation of over-the-counter broker-dealers.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the largest and most influential of
all the self-regulatory bodies with a predominant share of the total dollar
volume of all securities traded over the national securities markets. See note 7
infra. Accordingly, this Comment is devoted to an examination of the problem of
customers' fraud within the NYSE and an analysis of the remedies against
NYSE brokers which can be vindicated through employment of NYSE rule 405.
All of the analysis developed herein and resulting conclusions presumably should
be equally applicable to other self-regulatory agencies, such as those mentioned
above, which impose "know your customer" type duties on their member brokers.
The remedy of an implied federal cause of action for damages for violation of
these duties should exist with even greater certainty and fervor, furthermore, with
reference to NASD and over-the-counter brokers, both of whom are subject to
more direct SEC regulation than are the NYSE brokers. See notes 40, 65 infra.
5. For the text of rule 405, see note 62 infra.
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who, by failing to conduct adequate customer investigations, consummate the fraudulent securities transactions of their customers.
There are five primary remedies which can be asserted against
NYSE broker-dealers on behalf of the rightful owners of misappropriated securities or funds who are injured by customers' fraudulent
transactions conducted through NYSE members.

First, the Securi-

ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) can assert certain enforcement and disciplinary powers over stock exchanges and members
whose conduct violates the provisions of and rules promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).' Second, the New York Stock Exchange, as the largest self-regulatory
body under the Exchange Act, 7 can take disciplinary action against
its members and their representatives for violations of the NYSE
rules, including rule 405. Third, the rightful owner of stolen or misappropriated securities has various protections under Article Eight
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and pre-UCC law. 8

Fourth, the injured owner of securities or funds may bring a private
cause of action for damages against a broker-dealer under the primary anti-fraud regulation promulgated under the Exchange Act,
rule 10b-5. 9 Finally, the injured party may pursue the controversial

remedy of a private cause of action for damages under the Exchange Act for violation of NYSE rule 405 itself.10 For various
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).

See notes 40-55 infra and accompanying

text.
7. The NYSE is the largest stock exchange in the United States. In
1962, a total of 47.4 billion dollars worth of stock, rights, and warrants was transacted through the NYSE. This comprised 86 percent of the total dollar volume of
securities transacted on all registered stock exchanges. The second largest exchange, the American Stock Exchange, accounted for only seven percent of the
total dollar volume. Special Study, pt. 1, at 11.
8. See notes 89-135 infra and accompanying text.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972). Rule lob-5 was promulgated under section
10 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Other pertinent anti-fraud
provisions or rules in the federal securities laws include section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970) (see note 136 infra) and rule lOb-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-3 (1972), promulgated under section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act as an anti-fraud provision applying specifically to broker-dealers. Because the
operative language of rule 10b-3 is identical to that occurring in rule 10b-5, this
rule has not been used extensively either in SEC injunction or in civil damage
suits against broker-dealers.
10. The existence of a private cause of action for violations of rule 405 is
generally implied from a combination of several provisions of the Exchange Act.
Most pertinent of these statutory sources are the registration requirements in section 6(b) imposing on the stock exchanges a duty to promulgate rules to insure
that broker conduct is consistent with "just and equitable principles of trade,"
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970), and the provisions in section 27 which vest the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over all suits and actions brought to enforce
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reasons, the more accepted remedies accorded by the SEC and
NYSE enforcement powers, state law and the UCC, and rule lOb-5
do not provide injured parties with sufficient relief against NYSE
broker-dealers who consummate the fraudulent schemes of their customers.:" Furthermore, the implied federal cause of action for damages under the "know your customer" rule-the most direct and
seemingly necessary means for insuring adequate protection for the
investing public against customers' fraud-has been recognized judicially only in factual situations where a broker's failure to investigate
a customer is tantamount to actual fraud or reckless indifference.' 2
It is the conclusion of this Comment, therefore, that despite the apparent need for a broker's duty of due care redressable by implied
civil liability for violations of rule 405, none of the available remedies, as presently construed, provide adequate relief to enforce such
a standard.
CUSTOMERS' FRAUD IN THE NYSE MARKETS: THE -ROLE
AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BROKER

Most cases of customers' fraud effectuated through stock exchange broker-dealers can be categorized into two types of transactions. First, in the "source of funds" problem, a broker trades in
securities on behalf of a customer who has embezzled funds from a
third party.' 3 In the second type of customers' fraud, securities
themselves are misappropriated or stolen from their rightful owner
and then negotiated through a broker.' 4 After completing either
type of transaction, the defrauding customer may have fled the jurisdiction or disposed of the profits from the transaction and become
insolvent. Thus, the only form of relief which, as a practical matter,
will be meaningful to the original defrauded owner of misappropriated property is a remedy which can be asserted against the broker.
Accordingly, the analysis of this Comment will concentrate on the
liability of brokers for consummating customers' fraud transactions
and will attempt to determine an appropriate civilly-enforceable

standard of care to be imposed on NYSE brokers in conducting
investigations of their customers.
"any liability or duty created by" the Exchange Act, id. § 78aa. See notes 208-13
infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 51-55, 86-88, 134-35, 188-90 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 234-61 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 1.
14. See generally Insecure Securities, giving an excellent analysis of the pattern of thefts and crime which are consummated through brokerage firms.
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The Propriety of a Broker's Standard of Due Care for Conducting
CustomerInvestigations

Despite the fact that the New York Stock Exchange through its
rule 405 requires NYSE brokers to use "due diligence" to investigate every customer,' 5 the magnitude of the problem of customers'
fraud in the securities markets' tends to indicate that customer investigations are not, in practice, being performed with the requisite
degree of care.

Since the stock exchange brokers apparently are

not taking sufficient steps to prevent the consummation of customers'
fraudulent transactions, the losses incurred by the original owners
of misappropriated property in many cases will not be prevented or
mitigated. The fundamental question, then, is where to place the
burden of the resultant losse--upon the stock exchange broker who
exhibits negligence or even greater misconduct in failing to conduct
an adequate customer investigation, or upon the original owner who
may himself have been negligent by allowing securities to be stolen or
by entrusting securities or funds to a dishonest agent?1"
15. See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.
16. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
17. The issue is compounded ostensibly by the fact that the original owners of
defalcated property in customers' fraud cases often are brokerage firms or securities dealers and thus may have been guilty of some negligence themselves in entrusting securities or funds to dishonest agents or employees or in allowing securities to be stolen. For customers' fraud cases where the injured rightful owner of
misappropriated securities or funds is a brokerage firm or securities dealer, see
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. Ra. f 93,748 (N.D. 111. 1970) (stolen securities
case); cf. McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
93,541 (N.D. 111. 1972) ("source of funds" case in which the plaintiff
broker was suing only for the return of commissions paid to defendant NYSE
broker by plaintiff's employee, who was trading with misappropriated funds).
According to traditional judicial conceptions of contributory negligence, a plaintiff
who was negligent in allowing the loss or injury to occur should arguably be
precluded from recovery for the misconduct, especially mere negligence, of the
alleged wrongdoer. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTs §§ 65, 67 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEmENT (SECoND) OF ToaTs §§ 463-66 (1966). Cf. Mann, Rule
10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct To Replace the Catch Phrases of
Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206, 1214-18 (1970) (suggesting that a
plaintiff's character and conduct will affect his ability to recover under rule 10b.5).
It is worthy of note, furthermore, that NYSE rule 319 requires each NYSE member firm or corporation to obtain fidelity bonds covering its partners, officers and
employees. CCH NEw YORK STOCK ExcH. GUIDE
2319; see note 18 Infra.
NYSE brokerage firms, therefore, are required to carry indemnification insurance
against many defalcations committed by agents and employees and perhaps are in
a good position to bear the burden of such losses, rather than being allowed to recover damages against other defendant NYSE brokers who consummate securities
transactions for customers who are trading with the defalcated securities or funds.
Thus, there appear to be some arguments for disallowing recovery on behalf of
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While there is little conceptual difficulty in imposing liability
on a stock exchange broker whose failure to investigate a customer

has been reckless or even fraudulent in nature, it is at least questionable whether a broker, rather than other parties from whom

funds or securities were misappropriated originally, should be liable
for misconduct which is merely negligent or careless.

Nevertheless,

there appear to be at least four policy considerations which tend to
indicate that the broker should shoulder the responsibility for his

failure to exercise due care, rather than leaving the injured owner of
stolen or misappropriated property without an effective remedy.
Two policy reasons for imposing a standard of due care upon

the investigating broker are predicated, for the most part, on practical considerations.

First, the stock exchange broker can be viewed

as guarding a "gateway" through which investors must pass in order to trade in the national securities markets. Because of the broker's central position in the securities markets, perhaps the only uni-

form and efficient means, from an administrative standpoint, of preventing customers' fraud is to impose on all brokers an enforceable
duty of due care for policing prospective customers and their securities transactions. Aside from administrative necessity, a second

practical justification for making the broker liable for. losses incurred even by his mere negligence can be posited on economic
grounds. Simply stated, the brokerage firm may be in the best economic position to absorb, and pass on, the losses incurred by individual investors whose securities or funds are defalcated and then
used in stock exchange transactions. Under this theory, the broker
initially can shoulder the burden of a civil damage judgment, perhaps by insuring against his own liability,1 8 and then can distribute
the original owners of misappropriated property in cases where the negotiating
broker is guilty only of failing to exercise reasonable care in conducting customer investigations.
The above arguments break down partially, however, in view of the fact that
most lawsuits involving customers' fraud have been initiated by injured parties, or
their representatives, who in fact are innocent customers or creditors of the original defrauded brokerage firms and, therefore, appear worthy of some protection..
In the typical case, an employee of a defrauded brokerage firm has defalcated
securities or funds which actually belong to the customers or creditors of the firm,
the brokerage firm has gone bankrupt or been placed in a receivership, and a
trustee in bankruptcy, suing on behalf of the injured creditors, brings an action
against the stock exchange broker who allowed the dishonest employee to trade
with the misappropriated property. See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 383 (1969) (source
of funds case); Bush v. Bruns Nordeman Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. RPa.
93,674
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (source of funds case).
18. The NYSE already requires each member firm or corporation to carry
fidelity bonds for its partners, officers and employees and thereby to obtain in-
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the extra cost of this liability, or of the insurance premiums therefor,
evenly to all members of the investing public in the form of higher
brokerage commissions. 9 Thus, every securities investor, in exchange for the privilege and ease of trading upon the national ex-

change markets, would in essence be insuring against the risk of his
own potential loss through theft or defalcation.
A third possible justification for imposing on brokers a duty of
care to investigate customers can be predicated on the theory that

brokers are deemed to be professionals and thus expected to conduct
their transactions with concomitant professional responsibility. Brokers are required to meet relatively strict requirements in entering
the profession 20 and thereby gain the advantage and exclusive privi-

lege of earning commissions by trading in the national securities
markets on behalf of a wide variety of investors. In exchange for
this privilege, the investing public arguably has the right to exact a
high standard of conduct and professional responsibility from the
stock exchange broker. 21 Notably, quasi-fiduciary relationships bedemnification insurance against losses incurred as a result of certain types of defalcations committed by the member organization's agents and employees. See
2319 (1972)
NYSE rule 319, reprinted in CCH NEW YORK STOCK ExcH. GUDE
(requiring a blanket bond coverage for partners, officers, and employees, and specific bonding coverage with respect to losses caused by misplacement, fraudulent
trading, check forgery, and securities forgery). Id. 1 2319.11. Thus, it would not
appear unreasonable to expect, or require, NYSE brokerage firms to supplement
this fidelity bonding coverage by obtaining liability insurance also.
19. There are several theories of risk distribution currently debated in connection with tort law which would justify the imposition of liability upon the
broker for his negligent failure to comply with rule 405. Some commentators
have suggested that specific enterprises or industries, particularly ones with an
identifiable, frequent and foreseeable pattern of losses, ought to bear the risks for
losses suffered in their business. See Calabresi, Some Thought on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE LJ. 499 (1961). Another theory maintains
that losses should be spread out to the greatest number of persons who are best
able to sustain them regardless of who was at fault in causing the losses. Under
either theory, it would appear that the class of stock exchange brokers are in the
best position to bear the responsibility for the losses which they help to finalize by
consummating securities transactions on behalf of customers who trade with misappropriated funds or securities. See id. at 549-53 for a discussion of the analogous problem of risk distribution in the negotiable instruments area. See also
Gardner, Insurance Against Tort Liability-An Approach to the Cosmology of
the Law, 15 LAw & CoNT.mp. Pnon. 455 (1950); James & Thornton, The Impact
of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROn. 431 (1950); cf. also
Corker, Risk of Loss from Forged Indorsements 4 STAN. L. R v. 24 (1951).
20. See Special Study, pt. 1, at VI (letter of transmittal recommending that
Congress establish "standards of character, competence, and financial responsibility
as conditions for entry into the [brokerage] business"); see notes 40, 41, 44 & 65 infra
and accompanying text.
21. "One commentator espoused this theory recently with reference to a broker's duties under rule lOb-5:
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tween brokers and customers have already been recognized in areas
such as investment counselling,2 2 especially with reference to the

"suitability" of investments for customers. 23

Under such circum-

stances, brokers are deemed to have a stricter duty of care toward

their customers because of the reliance which customers place on a
broker's judgment, expertise, and knowledge of the securities mar-

ket.24 As a possible corollary, it would not appear unreasonable
to impose, under the guise of "professional responsibility," a similar

duty of care requiring brokers to investigate their customers for the
benefit of the investing public in general. 25
A final and perhaps most important justification for the imposition of civil liability on brokers for their negligent violations of the
"know your customer" rule can be premised on the policies and

objectives of the Exchange Act and particularly its anti-fraud provi[Biroker-dealers and their employees are subject to more stringent standards of liability than other persons who may violate the Rule [10b-51.
The shingle (or implied representation) theory is the source of much of
this stricter regulation. Higher standards of conduct are imposed on a
brokerage firm simply by virtue of its being in business-because it
hangs out its "shingle." Jacobs 876.
22. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson, & Curtis,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP.
92,748, at 99,276 (N.D.
Ill. 1970); see note 170 infra.
23. Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 MINN. L. REv. 233 (1966); Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the
Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51
COaNELL L.Q. 633 (1966); Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of BrokerDealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445; Rediker, Civil Liability of
Broker-Dealers Under SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. RaV. 15 (1969).
Recent cases, however, appear reluctant to allow private enforcement of a pure negligence standard under the NASD "suitability rule." See Wells v. Blythe & Co.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 93,759 (N.D. Cal. 1972); cases cited note 201 infra.
24. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) (broker said to have "a special duty, in view of
its expert knowledge," in dealing with unsophisticated customers and making representations about market conditions to them); Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321, 325
(1963); Barnett & Co., 40 S.E.C. 1, 4 (1960); Best See., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 934
(1960); William Harrison Keller, Jr., 38 S.E.C. 900, 905 (1959). The SEC first
propounded this theory in Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386, 388 (1939), where it
stated: "Inherent in the relationship between a dealer and his customer is the vital
representation that the customer will be dealt with fairly, and in accordance with
the standards of the profession." See Jacobs 876-81; Leawell, Investment Advice
and the Fraud Rules, 65 MicH. L. Rav. 1569 (1967); Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 644-45
(1963). Cf. Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAw & CoNrEMP.
PoB.691 (1964).
25. The courts, however, appear reluctant to recognize such a duty of care, at
least under rule lOb-5. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FkD. Sac. L. RPp. 1 92,748, at 99,276
(N.D. Ill.
1970); see note 170 infra.
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sions. 26 The Exchange Act was enacted essentially to achieve two
purposes: (1) to insure the maintenance of the "fairness and honesty, ' 27 as well as the integrity and efficiency 28 of the securities
markets, and (2) to enhance the protection of investors.29 On the
one hand, the efficiency of the securities markets-to the extent that
the concept encompasses the swiftness with which securities transations are consummated-might suffer to some degree by enforcing
a broker's duty of due care in making time-consuming and perhaps
expensive customer investigations."0 The honesty and integrity of
the stock exchange markets, on the other hand, would arguably be

advanced by such a duty. Faced with the specter of civil liability
premised on lack of diligence, stock exchange brokers would make a
serious effort to reduce the availability of stock exchange facilities
to securities transactions which are tainted with theft or defalcation.
Furthermore, a customer-investigation duty of care seems to be suggested, if not mandated, by the investor-protection purpose of the
Exchange Act. Since ultimate economic loss to the rightful owners
of misappropriated securities or funds is an almost natural result of
the broker's negligent course of conduct in failing to perform adequate customer investigations, these injured parties arguably are included within the general class of "investors" sought to be protected
by the Exchange Act. 8 ' The thrust of recent Supreme Court deci26. See Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a)
(1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972); see notes 136-37 infra and accompanying
text.
27. Section 2 of the Exchange Act stipulates that:
[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public
interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control
of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto . .. in
order to . .. insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such
transactions ...
"' 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).

28. The Second Circuit recently posited the Exchange Act purposes:
Obviously Congress was concerned about the plight of the average public investor who is at a serious disadvantage in dealing with persons possessing superior knowledge, skill and resources. But the public in the
role of investor is only part of the picture. The integrity and efficiency
of the securities markets are even more important since our economy is
dependent upon these markets. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L.

REP.

93,816 (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 1973).

See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
29. See, -e.g., Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) (directing
the SEC to promulgate rules to outlaw manipulative or deceptive devices "as necessary or appropriate ... for the protection of investors"). See also Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,816 (2d Cir. Mar. 16,
1937); see note 28 supra. For a general discussion of the legislative purposes underlying the Exchange Act, see Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WAsir. L. Rnv. 214 (1959); Tracy &
MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MicH. L. REv. 1025 (1934).

30. See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 152-55 infra and accompanying text.
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sions, in addition, seems to extend the scope of federal securities antifraud protection to misconduct in the business community which
may be only tangentially connected with a "jurisdictional" securities
transaction.
In short, the underlying policies of the Exchange Act, the broker's obligation to the investing public by virtue of his profession, as
well as several practical and economic justifications, seem to suggest
valid reasons for making the stock exchange broker responsible for
losses which could have been prevented by a reasonable investigation
of potential customers. Accordingly, a basic assumption of this
Comment is that the rightful owner of misappropriated securities or
investment funds should be provided an effective remedy against the
broker.
Broker's Duty to Supervise Local Representatives and Employees
It is evident that the ability of a brokerage firm to detect the
fraudulent schemes of its customers depends on the extent to which
brokers' representatives in brokerage firm offices throughout the
country can investigate their prospective customers and their proposed securities transactions carefully. 3 For several reasons, however, these individual securities salesmen, if left to themselves, cannot be relied upon to make the requisite investigation of customers
in many cases. First, because of a dramatic increase in securities investment in the last two decades and a concomitant need for more
branch-office representatives to handle the new business, the brokerage firm representatives are often poorly trained, inexperienced, and
sometimes dishonest in handling customers' investment accounts. 4
The brokers' representatives, furthermore, are faced with a fundamental conflict of interest. On the one hand, a broker is told to
make a thorough investigation of customers, which is time-consuming and expensive."' As a salesman working on commission, how32. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971);
see note 145 infra.
33. See Special Study, pt. 1, at 291-302; Comment, Brokerage Firm's Liability for Salesman's FraudulentPractices,36 FoRm. L. Rav. 95 (1967).
NYSE Rule 345 requires that all representatives or employees of NYSE member firms must be registered with the Exchange.
34. Special Study, pt. 1, at 21-26, 290-91 n.113. See Reynolds & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6273 (May'25, 1960), for a discussion by the SEC of the
problems of ill-trained and inexperienced securities representatives in an expanding securities market.
35. For a discussion of the "know-your-customer" type rules and procedures
with which the NYSE broker is supposed to comply, see notes 62-64 infra and

accompanying text.
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ever, the brokerage firm representative makes money by high volume
sales and rapid transactions."0 To the extent that the "know your
customer" investigatory duties impede salesmen from making money,
therefore, there is a natural incentive to forego any thorough investigation of their customers' proposed transactions. 7
With the growth of public investment, the corresponding increase in brokerage firm personnel and branch office operations, the
high degree of crime in the securities market,38 and the inherent
conflict of interest facing the broker working on commission, the
need for adequate supervision within brokerage houses has become
increasingly acute. In order to protect the investing public properly, the burden of preventing customers' fraud must necessarily rest
on the controlling management of each brokerage firm. 0 Consequently, the remedies provided for injured parties must be viable
against the brokerage firm itself as well as against the firm's local
representative or employee who actually conducts a securities transaction.
SEC CONTROLS

OVER NYSE

BROKERS

Under the Exchange Act, the primary responsibility for control
and regulation of stock exchange brokers is left up to the national
exchanges."0 Despite this underlying principle of stock exchange
36. See Special Study, pt. 1, at 253-61.
37. For a general discussion of these conflict of interest problems which face
the stock exchange brokers, see O'Boyle, Broker-Dealer Conflict of Interest Problems, TnD ANNUAL INsrnuT ON SEcuRInE REGULATION 457 (R. Mundheim
& A. Fleischer eds. 1972); Special Study pt. 1, at 242-61.
38. See note 2 supra.
39. This was the conclusion of the comprehensive Special Study of Securities
Markets conducted by the SEC in the early 1960's. The authors of this study
believed poor supervision of brokerage firms to be one of the most serious problems
confronting the securities industry. Special Study, pt. 1, at 328. See Comment,
supra note 33; Unsafe Practices,supra note 1, at 145-50. The New York Stock Exchange is profoundly concerned with the problem of member firms' management
and supervision of their representatives in trading with customers. See N.Y.
STOCK EXCH., SUPERVISI6Oi
AND
AND CusTomER AccouNTs (1967).

MANAGEMENT

OF REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES

40. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349-61 (1963); Jenungs, Self-Regulation of the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 29 Lw & CoirrEN . PROB. 663 (1964). See also 2 Loss
1179-83 (1962); Shipman 964-80.
While Chairman of the SEC, Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas described the self-regulatory scheme in the securities industry as "letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government
would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned,
ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used." W. DOuGLAS,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940), quoted in Silver v. New York
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self-regulation, the SEC can exercise certain residual controls over
the stock exchanges and their brokers. First, an indirect regulatory
influence over stock exchange brokers is maintained by the SEC
through requirements in sections 541 and 642 of the Exchange Act

that all national exchanges register with the SEC. As a condition of
registration, each exchange must agree to comply with, and to en-

force compliance among its members with, provisions of the Exchange Act and SEC rules issued thereunder. 43 Each registered exchange, in addition, must maintain its own rules for disciplining any
member for "conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade ....

A second major source of federal regulatory control over stock
exchanges and brokers is the SEC's rule-making and disciplinary

power under section 19 of the Exchange Act.4" Of primary importance is the SEC's power under section 19(b) to change or supplant stock exchange rules when "necessary or appropriate" for the

protection of investors or when necessary to insure "fair dealing in
securities" or "fair administration" of the stock exchange. 46

The

SEC is also authorized by section 19(a)(1) to suspend or withdraw
the registration of any exchange for violation of, or failure to insure
the compliance of members with, the Exchange Act or SEC rules.47

In addition to this indirect disciplinary control over the brokers of
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 352 (1963). See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1934) (House report which indicates some of the initial congressional
conceptions of self-regulation in the securities industry).
41. Section 5 of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any broker or exchange, directly or indirectly, to use any facility of an exchange in interstate
commerce "to effect any transaction in a security, or to report any such transaction," unless the exchange is registered under section 6 of the Exchange Act or is
exempted from registration by the SEC due to its limited volume. 15 U.S.C."
§ 78e (1970).
42. Id. § 78f.
43. Id. § 78f(a)(1); see Shipman 964-80.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970). Stock exchange rules must also provide that
"willful violations" of the Exchange Act and its rules shall be deemed to be conduct or proceedings "inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade." Id.
45. Id. §§ 78s(a)-(b). See generally Cary, Administrative Agencies and
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 Lhw & CONThMP. PROB. 653 (1964);
Jennings, supra note 40.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970).
The SEC also has power under section 11 of the Exchange Act to make its
own rules to govern exchange members directly in such areas as the regulation and
prevention of floor trading and excessive off the floor trading by exchange members. id. § 78k. However, the SEC very rarely exercises its rule-making power
in section 11. Rather, the SEC follows the practice of "suggesting" that exchanges themselves adopt any necessary rules. See Jennings, supra note 40, at 664.
47. 15U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1970).
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registered stock exchanges, the SEC may assert some direct disci-

plinary influence through its power under section 19(a)(3) to suspend or expel any exchange member, or officer thereof, who has

violated the Exchange Act and its rules or has "effected any transaction for any other person who, he has reason to believe," is violating
48

such provision.
A final basis for federal control over stock exchange brokers is

the SEC's enforcement power in section 21(e) to file civil suits in
federal courts to enjoin any person from violating the provisions of
the Exchange Act or "any rule or regulation thereunder." 49 Furthermore, in cases involving egregious violations of the federal se-

curities laws, the SEC can recommend that the Justice Department
initiate a criminal prosecution against the offender.50
Exercise by the SEC of the above powers to enforce the Exchange Act and to discipline exchanges, member firms, and their

officers has, however, been a relatively ineffective means of solving
the problem of customers' fraud in the national securities markets.5

In the first place, the SEC's disciplinary powers are inadequate for
this purpose because the Commission has no disciplinary control
48. The Commission is authorized, if in its opinion such action is necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors . . (3) After appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, by order to suspend for a
period not exceeding twelve months or to expel from a national securities
exchange any member or officer thereof whom the Commission finds has
violated any provision of this chapter [the Exchange Act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder, or has affected any transaction for any other
person who, he has reason to believe, is violating in respect of such transaction any provision of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Id. § 78s(a)(3).
Nowhere in section 19 does the SEC have explicit power to discipline stock exchange brokers for anything other than violations of the Exchange Act provisions
or its rules. However, the last clause in section 19(a) is arguably a basis for the
assertion by the SEC of disciplinary control over brokers who violate stock exchange rules. This will occur in situations where the act of effectuating an Exchange-Act-violating transaction on behalf of a violator, coupled with the existence
of a "reason to know" about the violation, is per se or in effect a simultaneous
violation of a stock exchange rule. If a broker, for example, has a reason to believe that a customer is investing fraudulently in violation of rule 10b-5, see note
138 infra and accompanying text, then in all probability he will breach the "due
diligence" investigation duties of rule 405 (see notes 62-64 infra and accompanying
text) by consummating the fraudulent transaction of the customer. Thus, it seems
possible for the SEC to discipline some broker misconduct which also constitutes a
rule 405 violation, and thus indirectly to discipline, in effect, violations of rule
405 itself.
49. Id. § 78u(e). See 3 Loss 1975-83; The Work of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Dec. 1966), reprinted in W. CARY, CORPORATIONs A-79, A-87 (4th
ed. 1969).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970); see 3 Loss, 1993-94; The Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 49, at A-87.
51. See 2 Loss 1172-78.
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over the individual representatives of brokerage firms, and it has
exhibited reluctance to invoke the relatively drastic remedy of suspension or expulsion against those parties over whom it does have
some control-members, member firms or their officers, and the
national exchanges. 52 Second, the SEC's disciplinary authority and
power to file civil injunctions extend only to violations of the Exchange Act and SEC rules and thus provide no relief per se for
breaches of important investor-protection stock exchange rules, such
as the "know your customer" rule.5 Finally, neither the SEC disciplinary controls nor injunction suits provide for an award of money
damages, which, as a rule, is the only adequate compensatory relief
to persons injured by customers' fraudulent schemes.54 Thus, due to
principles of self-regulation embodied in the Exchange Act regulatory scheme, as well as the shortcomings of SEC enforcement and
disciplinary powers as a viable remedy against the misconduct of individual brokers, the prevention of customers' fraud by direct SEC
or Exchange action can result, if at all, only from the enforcement
by each stock exchange of its own rules.55
Prevention of Customers' Fraud by NYSE Enforcement of the
"Know Your Customer" Rule
Stock exchanges, pursuant to section 6(a) of the Exchange
52. See id.
53. See note 48 supra. "[O]ne of the functions of rule 405 is to protect the
public . . . ." Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d
135, 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
54. The Supreme Court in J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), emphasized the important role in securities regulation of allowing recovery of damages
by injured parties:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement
to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective
weapon in the enforcement of the proxy requirements. Id. at 432.
Similarly, in recognizing that a frustrated tender offeror has a private cause of
action for damages against a target company who defeats the offeror's bid for
control by promulgating misleading communications in violation of section 14(e)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), the Second Circuit stated recently:
The SEC of course has been entrusted-by the statutes and implementing decisions--with the primary responsibility of protecting the public interest under the federal securities laws. But the Supreme Court, as
well as other federal courts including our own, have [esic) recognized that vigorous enforcement of the federal securities laws, particularly the antifraud
provisions, can be accomplished effectively only when implemented by
private damage actions. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,816, at 93,499 (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 1973).
55. There are serious inadequacies in the NYSE disciplinary controls, also, as
a means of providing relief against customers' fraud in the national secirities markets. See notes 86-88 infra and accompanying text.
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Act,5" are charged with the responsibility of enacting and enforcing

rules to regulate their members and, indeed, constitute the primary
regulatory authority over exchange brokers.

Each exchange may

make rules regarding exchange procedure and membership so long
as the rules are consistent with state law,5 7 existing federal securities
legislation,5 s and, presumably, the "just and equitable principles of
trade."59 These rule-making powers and principles are also embodied in the constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, wherein
the board of directors of the exchange is authorized to adopt rules
pertaining to disciplinary measures and matters such as the offices
and business conduct of member brokerage firms. 6°
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1970). See Jennings, supra note 40, at 684-90.
57. Section 6(c) of the Exchange Act provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent any exchange from
adopting and enforcing any rule not inconsistent with this chapter and
the rules and regulations thereunder and the applicable laws of the State
in which it is located. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1970).
58. The exchanges pursuant to section 6(a)(1) of the Exchange Act must
agree with the SEC to comply with, and enforce compliance by its members with,
the prov isions of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder. Id. § 78f(a)(1).
Stock exchange rules must also be consistent, to a large degree, with the federal antitrust laws. In Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), for
example, the Supreme Court held that the duties of self-regulatory bodies under
the Exchange Act, absent an express statutory exemption, did not exempt such
bodies from existing federal antitrust laws-notably section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The Court held, furthermore, that any given instance
of stock exchange self-regulation would "be regarded as justified in response to
antitrust charges only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the
aims of the Securities Exchange Act . . . ." 373 U.S. at 361.
59. Exchange Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970). One of the primary
objectives of establishing self-regulatory bodies in the securities industry was to
provide a means of imposing ethical standards as well as legal constraints on
brokers through semi-private professional organizations like exchanges and securities associations. Thus the rules of self-regulatory agencies enunciate ethical as
well as legal standards with which brokers must comply. See Rediker, supra note 23,
at 16.
60. Article m, section 1 of the NYSE constitution provides, in pertinent part:
The Board of Directors shall be vested with all the powers necessary
for the government of the Exchange, the regulation of the business conduct of members, allied members, member firms and member corporations
of the Exchange . . .and the promotion of the welfare, objects and purposes of the Exchange and in the exercise of such powers may adopt
such rules, issue such orders and directions and make such decisions as it
may deem appropriate.
Penalties
The Board of Directors may prescribe and impose penalties for the
violation of rules adopted pursuant to the Constitution and for neglect
or refusal to comply with the orders, directions or decisions of the
Board or for any offense against the Exchange the penalty for which is
not specifically prescribed by the Constitution. N.Y. Stock Exch. Const.
art. 111, § 1, reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GumE 1 1101 (1972).
Rule 405 applies to all "member organizations" of the Exchange, see note 62
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Rule 405-the "Know Your Customer" Rule

Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the board of directors of
the New York Stock Exchange enacted rule 405 arguably as an at-

tempt to cope with the problem of detecting and preventing customers' fraud and as a means for insuring adequate supervision of
representatives in brokerage houses."' Rule 405 requires, first, that
every member firm, through a general partner, a principal executive
officer, or other controlling person, must use "due diligence" to learn

the "essential facts" relative to every customer, order or account accepted or carried by the firm."'

Rule 405, furthermore, has a spe-

nfra, which presumably includes member firms and member corporations. A
"member" of the Exchange is a person who qualifies for membership through satisfaction of the requirements of article IX of the NYSE constitution. See N.Y.
Stock Exch. Const. art. IX, §§ 1-15, reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y. SToCK EXCH.
GUiDE 11 1401-15 (1972). A "member firm" or "member corporation" is defined
as an organization transacting business as a broker or dealer in securities, at least
one of whose general partners, or officer/shareholders, respectively, is a member
of the Exchange. Id. art. I, §§ 3(c)-(f), reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH.
GUIDE 1 1003. The broad definition of exchange "member" provided in section
3(a)(3) of the Exchange Act, by comparison, includes the individual members,
member firms, and all partners of member firms. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3)
(1970).
61. It is worthy of note, however, that during the public hearings in conjunction with the 1963 Special Study of the Securities Market, G. Keith Funston,
president of the New York Stock Exchange, maintained that rule 405 was primarily designed to protect firms against financially irresponsible customers. Special
Study, pt. 1, at 239 n.15, 316. This initial purpose of rule 405 is reflected in the
NYSE publication which guides brokers in their compliance with rule 405. See
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SUPERVISION & MANAGEMENT OF REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES
AND CusToMER Accour.rs 7, 91 (1967). See also Hoblin 266 n.56. One court

has posited, however, that rule 405 was designed for the protection of investors.
See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
62. Rule 405 provides, in pertinent part:
Every member organization is required through a general partner, a
principal executive officer or a person or persons designated under the
provision of Rule 32(b) (1) to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every
customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried
by such organization and every person holding power of attorney over
any account accepted or carried by such organization.
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the organization.
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or
promptly after the completion of any transaction for the account of or
with a customer, provided, however, that in the case of branch offices, the
opening of an account for a customer may be approved by the manager of
such branch office but the action of such branch office manager shall
within a reasonable time be approved by a general partner, a principal
executive officer or a person or persons designated under the provisions of
Rule 342(b)(1). The member, general partner, officer or designated
person approving the opening of the account shall, prior to giving his
approval, be personally informed as to the essential facts relative to the
customer and to the nature of the proposed account and shall indicate
his approval in writing on a document which is a part of the permanent
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cific measure addressing the supervision problem, requiring that a
general partner, principle executive officer or other controlling
member of a brokerage firm must "supervise diligently" all customer
accounts handled by registered representatives of the firm.03

Fi-

nally, such controlling members of the firm are required to approve
specifically the opening of a new account prior to or shortly after
the completion of a transaction in that account. 64 Thus, under the
express wording of the rule, major responsibility for insuring the
adequate investigation of customers and their transactions rests with
the controlling management of the brokerage firm and not with the
firms' representatives.65
records of his office or organization. Rule 405, reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y.
STOCK ExcH. GUIDE 2405 (1972).
The New York Stock Exchange has published specific procedures for its member
firms to follow in order to comply with rules 342 and 405. See N.Y. STOCK Exc.,
SUPERVISION & MANAGEMENT, supra note 39.
63. Rule 405(2), supra note 62. In its published guidance on the subject of
broker supervision, the New York Stock Exchange stresses that the ultimate responsibility for supervision and control of customer accounts rests with the top
management of each member firm and that the authority to execute supervisory
procedures should be delegated specifically to a partner, officer or manager of the
sales force at each branch office. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SUPERVISION AND MANAGEmeNT, supra note 39, at 2. The duties of supervisors of registered representatives
should include, as a minimum, approval of new accounts, review of correspondence
and transactions of representatives, and review of customer accounts. 2 CCH
N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GIDE 2342.16 (1972).
64. Rule 405(3), supra note 62. Concerning new accounts, the exchange
recommends that the following information be acquired for each prospective customer account: the customer's full name, all business and home addresses and
telephone numbers, citizenship, age, type of account, social security number, and
other vital statistics. See N.Y. STOCK ExcH., SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT,
supra note 39, at 7-9. Each representative should also acquire information on the
customer's credit references, how the account was acquired, how long the account
has been known, and the customer's intentions as to the initial securities transaction, Id. Also, the customer's occupation should be discerned in order to
assure that the exchange rules concerning employees of other securities firms
and financial organizations are not being violated. Id. at 8. See 2 CCH N.Y.
STOCK ExcrH. GUIDE
2342 (1972). Furthermore, the representative should inquire into the status of important legal documents such as signature cards, margin
agreements, corporation and partnership agreements, trust agreements, and powers of attorney. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., SUPERVISION ANM MANAGEMENT, supra
note 39, at 8-9. Finally, the initials or signatures of the registered representatives, approving branch manager, and accepting partner or officer in the main office should be obtained and placed on the new account form to insure that proper
investigatory procedures have been followed. Id. at 9. Customer accounts should
be reviewed periodically on a regular basis by both the branch and main offices.
See id. at 12-22.
65. See note 63 supra. Section 15(b)(5)(E) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970), and SEC rule 15b10-4 promulgated thereunder, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15b10-4 (1972), impose analogous duties on over-the-counter brokerdealers to investigate their customers and to supervise their representatives. See
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JudicialConstruction of Rule 405
The "source of funds" problem. There is relatively little judicial construction of the nature of the duties imposed on brokers by
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9420 (Dec. 20, 1971), reprinted in
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fa. SEc. L. REP.
21,952; Jacobs 963-64.
Section 15(b) (5) (E) authorizes the SEC to censure or to suspend, deny or
revoke registration of any broker or dealer who has willfully aided, abetted,
counselled, or induced the violation of the provisions and rules of the federal securities laws by any other person or who "has failed reasonably to
supervise, with a view of preventing violations of [the federal securities laws and
the rules thereunder] another person who commits such a violation, if such other
person is subject to his supervision." 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(E) (1970). A
broker-dealer is deemed to have fulfilled the duty to supervise pursuant to section
15(b) (5) (E) if: (1) it has "established procedures, and a system for applying
such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect . . .
any such violation" of the federal securities laws by the subordinate person; and
(2) the broker "has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent
upon him by reason of such procedures and system without reasonable cause to
believe that such procedures and system were not being complied with." Id. See,
e.g., Bercow v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1964-1965 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEc.
L. REP. %91,585 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Brodsky, supra note 1.
In addition to the express provisions of section 15(b)(5)(E) of the Exchange
Act, the SEC and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) each
have promulgated rules which further delineate the supervisory responsibilities of
over-the-counter broker-dealers--namely, SEC rule 15b10-4 and section 27 of the
NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
Supervisory and "Know-Your-Customer" Duties of Non-NASD, Over-theCounter Brokers. SEC rule 15b10-4 applies to every "nonmember broker or
dealer," which means any over-the-counter broker-dealer who is registered as a
broker or dealer under section 15 of the Exchange Act and who is not also a
member of any national securities association. See rule 15b10-1(a), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15blO-1(a) (1972). Rule 15b10-4 requires all such nonmember brokerdealers to supervise their "associated persons." "Associated persons" is defined
as: the partners, officers, directors, branch managers of, persons directly or indirectly controlled by, or any non-clerical or non-ministerial employees of, a "nonmember" broker-dealer. Id. § 240.15b10-l(b) (1972). The text of rule 15b10-4
provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Every nonmember broker or dealer shall exercise diligent supervision over all the securities activities of all of his associated persons.
(b) Every associated person of the nonmember broker or dealer shall be
subject to the supervision of a supervisor designated by such broker or
dealer .....
(c) As part of his responsibility under this rule, every nonmember
broker or dealer shall establish, maintain, and enforce written procedures
. . . which shall
rule... :

...

comply with the following duties imposed by this

(1) The review and written approval by the designated supervisor of the opening of each new customer account;
(2) The frequent examination of all customer accounts to detect and prevent irregularities or abuses;
(3) The prompt review and written approval by the designated
supervisor of all securities transactions by associated persons and all correspondence pertaining to the solicitation or execution of all securities
transactions by associated persons . . . . Id. § 240.15b10-4.
Rule 15b10-4(d) provides, finally, that if a non-NASD broker-dealer has desig-
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rule 405 where a customer is buying securities with misappropriated
funds. 6 6 The leading "source of funds" case, Buttrey v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,87 indicates that a broker pur-

chasing securities on behalf of his customer has a general duty under
rule 405 to use due diligence to inquire into a customer's financial
stability, credit standing, and source of funds. Moreover, a broker's
failure to make a thorough investigation will be especially flagrant if
the broker is aware of suspicious circumstances about a customer,
such as his financial instability or 68the erratic and speculatory nature of his previous trading practices.
nated more than one supervisor pursuant to the rule, then it must designate one
person or group of persons to supervise and review periodically the activities of the
firm's supervisors and to inspect periodically each broker-dealer's business office
to insure compliance with the firm's written supervisory procedures. Id. §
240.15b10-4(d).
NASD Rules of Practice. The analogous supervisory rule for over-the-counter
brokers in the NASD is section 27 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, reprinted
in CCH NASD MANUAL
2177 (1967), promulgated pursuant to section 15A
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970). Similar to SEC rule 15b10-4,
section 27 of the NASD Rules requires brokers to supervise the activities of
their associated persons and to establish regular procedures to maintain this
supervision. Each broker is charged with reviewing the activities of every
branch officer and performing a periodic examination of customer accounts
in order to detect and prevent irregularities and abuses in securities transactions.
Thus, it appears that Rule 27 implicitly imposes the same duties on over-thecounter brokers to investigate customers and supervise employees that is contemplated by rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange.
66. As of the date of printing of this Comment, there appear to be only three
cases examining a violation of rule 405 in connection with a customer's misappropriation of funds. See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McMaster
Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 93,541 (N.D. IIl. 1972).
67. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
68. Id. The Buttrey court held that there could be a valid cause of action for
damages against a broker for violation of rule 405 when the alleged facts indicated
that the broker displayed a "callous disregard" of rule 405 by trading on behalf of
a customer whom the broker had reason to know was investing with embezzled
funds. Id. at 141-44. In Buttrey, the president of Dobich Securities Co. opened
a cash account with Merrill Lynch and then traded securities through Merrill
Lynch with funds which customers of Dobich Securities had given to the president
for other specific purposes. The Buttrey court indicated that Merrill Lynch had
violated rule 405 flagrantly and recklessly by trading on the president's behalf:
The pertinent allegations are that Michael Dobich was financially unstable and was a big speculator in securities and commodities. In 1962,
he issued three checks to defendant [Merrill Lynch] to pay for securities, and the checks were returned for insufficient funds. Defendant suspended him from trading in commodities because of his erratic trading
practices. Nevertheless, in December 1963, defendant granted Michael
Dobich's request to open a cash account in the name of the bankrupt
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The Buttrey case, in addition, appears to be the only judicial
examination of the specific parameters for a broker's compliance
with this "due diligence" investigation of a purchasing customer.
According to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Buttrey, the broker,
before opening an account and trading for his customer, initially
should obtain financial statements, bank references and credit reports
of his customer.69 Then, if the customer himself is a broker or
dealer, the NYSE broker should ascertain whether the customer has
filed the requisite financial condition reports with appropriate regulatory authorities, such as the SEC.7 Finally, the broker should
determine whether the customer is acting as a principal or agent in
the securities transaction and thereby ascertain his source of funds."1
The stolen securities problem. The theft of securities and their
negotiation through brokers who do not comply with their duties
under rule 405 is conceived by the courts as an entirely different
problem than is the "source of funds" type of customers' fraud.
The primary reason for this conceptual difference is that Article
Eight of the UCC 72 (and other state negotiable instrument laws
prior to the enactment of Article Eight) govern almost exclusively
the negotiation and transfer of investment securities. 7 3 Since section 6(c) of the Exchange Act allows the stock exchanges to issue
rules which are "not inconsistent" with applicable laws of the state
where the exchange is located, 4 it is not surprising that the courts
have construed rule 405's requirements in a manner consistent
with the state law of negotiable instruments.
This malleability of rule 405 in relation to the UCC is demonstrated by two recent cases, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Walston & Co.,"5 and Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis.76 In Walston an NYSE broker failed to inves[Dobich Securities], of which he was the sole shareholder and principal

officer.

.

.

. Defendant is also alleged to have known after January 20,

1946, that the money used by Michael Dobich in the bankrupt's securities
transactions belonged to its customers and was fraudulently converted.
•

..

Thereafter, defendant permitted Michael Dobich to speculate in

large stock transactions for the bankrupt . . . . Id. at 141.
69. Id. For a discussion of NYSE published guidelines for opening new
customer accounts, see note 64 supra.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. UNUORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-102(l),-105.
73. See note 89 infra.
74. Exchange Act § 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1970); see note 57 supra.
75. 21 N.Y.2d 219, 234 N.E.2d 230, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1967), modified on
other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 672, 238 N.E.2d 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968).
76. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. q 92,748 (N.D.
Il1. 1970).
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tigate a selling customer and therefore did not ascertain that the customer had forged the indorsement of securities which were fraudulently registered in the name of a fictitious person. The Court of

Appeals of New York concluded that the "know your customer"
rule requires a broker to use due diligence to inquire into the true
identity of the indorser with whom he is dealing in cases where the
broker receives a stock certificate which is issued in a particular
name and can be transferred only by an indorsement. 77

Rather

77. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 227-28,
234 N.E.2d 230, 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 67 (1967), modified on other grounds, 22
N.Y.2d 672, 238 N.E.2d 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968). According to the provisions of the UCO, a security is characterized as being issued either in bearer or
registered form. UNIFORm CoMm .axI, CODE § 8-102(1)(a)(i). A security is
in bearer form when "it runs to bearer according to its terms and not by reason of
any indorsement." Id. § 8-102(1)(d). Such a security can be transferred by
delivery alone without any indorsement, see Gruntal v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930), a transferability similar to that
accorded negotiable instruments payable to bearer and governed by Article Three
of the UCC. See UNiFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-204(2). A security is in
registered form, on the other hand, when "it specifies a person entitled to the security or to the rights it evidences and when its transfer may be registered upon
books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf .. ." of the issuer. Id.
§ 8-102(1)(c). The transfer of a security in registered form will not be consummated, at least not sufficiently to give the transferee the rights of a "bona-fide
purchaser" (see note 108 infra and accompanying text), unless and until the security is delivered and an indorsement is made by the "appropriate person"-the
person specified by the security, or by a special indorsement, to be entitled to
the security. See id. §§ 8-307, 308. Thus, a registered security is transferred
properly only by a combination of delivery and indorsement. See id. § 8-308,
Comment 3.
Article Eight of the UCC provides two ways in which a security in registered
form can be properly indorsed and thus transferred: "special" or "blank" indorsement. Id. § 8-308(2). A special indorsement "specifies the person to whom the
security is to be transferred, or who has power to transfer it." Id. The UCC
stipulates, on the other hand, that "fain indorsement in blank includes an indorsement to bearer." Id. Presumably, therefore, a security indorsed in blank by the
appropriate person (the registered owner, or a person entitled by special indorsement to ownership of the security, id. § 8-308(3) ) becomes equivalent to a
security in bearer form and can be properly transferred thereafter by delivery alone.
See, e.g., National Safe Deposit Co. v. Hibbs, 229 U.S. 391, 394 (1913) (common
law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,748 (N.D. Il. 1970) (UCC);
United States Gypsum Co. v. Farrell, 296 Ill.
App. 47, 15 N.E.2d 888 (1938)
(Uniform Stock Transfer Act); Russell v. American Bell Tel. Co., 180 Mass. 467,
62 N.E. 751 (1902) (common law); Peckinpaugh v. H.W. Noble & Co., 238 Mich.
464, 213 N.W. 859 (1927) (Uniform Stock Transfer Act); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 222, 234 N.E.2d 230, 234, 287
N.Y.S.2d 58, 62-63 (1967); Turnbull v. Longacre Bank, 249 N.Y. 159, 163 N.E.
135 (1928). Cf. UNrFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-204(2) ("An instrument payable to 6rder and indorsed in blank becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed").
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than viewing rule 405 as making dramatic inroads into the state
law of negotiable instruments, however, the Walston court seemed to

recognize that such an inquiry was part of a broker's traditional
duty to observe "reasonable commercial standards" in receiving spe8
cially indorsed securities from its customers.7

In Aetna, on the other hand, the potential breadth of a broker's
rule 405 duties was placed in direct confrontation with "the policy
In sum, both a security issued in bearer form and a security issued in registered form and indorsed by the rightful owner in blank can be thereafter transferred by delivery alone. The rule in the Aetna case, see note 79 infra and accompanying text, will relieve a selling broker from making a customer investigation
whenever he accepts delivery of either of these two types of bearer securities.
On the other hand, all other securities in registered form can be transferred
properly only by delivery and indorsement. Whenever a broker receives the latter
type of registered securities from a selling customer, the rule laid down by the
Walston court, see note 60 infra, imposes on the broker a duty to make a complete rule 405 investigation of his customer.
In the Walston case, stock certificates had been purchased by Bache & Co., a
securities dealer, indorsed in blank by the seller, and then delivered to Bache &
Co. An employee of Bache & Co. fraudulently directed Bache's transfer agent to
transfer the certificates over to the name of a fictitious person, and then the employee misappropriated the stock certificates from the return mail. An accomplice later opened an account with a NYSE broker, sold the securities through
the broker, indorsed the securities specifically over to the broker by forging the
name of the fictitious payee, and received the proceeds of the sale. 21 N.Y.2d
at 223, 234 N.E.2d at 233, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 63-64. Although it is not entirely
clear from the facts presented whether the stock certificates in WaIston were in
fact indorsed by the customer specially to the broker or in blank, the Walston
court appeared reluctant to treat securities issued in a fictitious name and transferred with a forged endorsement as securities indorsed properly in blank. See id.
at 227-28, 234 N.E.2d at 236-37, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 66-68.
In receiving the forged securities, the only customer investigation made by
the selling broker in Walston was a request for "one or two" identification cards.
Id. at 223, 234 N.E.2d at 233, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 63. The Court of Appeals of
New York held that the broker had failed to make the proper "due diligence"
investigation required by rule 405. Id. at 226-28, 234 N.E.2d at 236-37, 287
N.Y.S.2d at 66-68 (1967).
78. 21 N.Y.2d at 226, 234 N.E.2d at 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 66. See notes 116-34
infra and accompanying text. Walston's construction of rule 405 is simply in line
with the policy and provisions of Article Eight of the UCC, which imposes
stricter duties on transferees who receive specifically indorsed securities registered
in a particular name than on transferees who take delivery of bearer securities or
securities indorsed by the rightful owner in blank. The Walston court compared
these different duties of inquiry:
It is the policy of the law, to be sure, to protect the selling broker where
he comes into possession of a certificate indorsed by the true owner in
blank, in which instance he has the right to assume (absent notice to the
contrary) that the owner would take the same care of the security that
he would a bearer bond and be subjected to the same consequences of
theft . .

.

. The selling broker is charged with a somewhat greater re-

sponsibility where he receives a stock certificate issued in a particular
name. In such instance he is required to use due diligence to ascertain
the identity of the person with whom he is dealing and who signs the
indorsement. hi. at 227-28, 234 N.E.2d at 236, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
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of free negotiability of securities indorsed in blank which is now the
rule in almost every state. ' 79 In Aetna, an NYSE broker had not
performed the customer investigation ostensibly imposed by rule 405
and consequently a dishonest customer was able to negotiate through
the broker stolen securities indorsed in blank. The Aetna court held,
however, that when a customer tenders securities indorsed by the
rightful owner in blank or otherwise in bearer form, rule 405 does not
require any "due diligence" .investigation, at least in the absence of
some special circumstances to put the broker on notice of their stolen
nature.80 The court stated its holding:
Rule 405 does not, however, require a broker to ascertain the title of
negotiable securities tendered for sale, nor does it expressly require
an investigation of whether a customer tendering securities indorsed
in blank is the owner of the securities tendered."'
In reaching this result, the Aetna court seemed concerned with insuring that the duties imposed by a literal construction of rule 405's
"due diligence" duties would not contravene Article Eight's clear
policy favoring the free negotiability of investment securities indorsed
in blank. Thus, in neither Walston nor Aetna did the NYSE broker
conduct an investigation of a customer tendering securities for sale.
Due to the different nature of the securities transactions involved
and their relation to the UCC, however, the broker was held to violate rule 405 in Walston but not in Aetna.
Enforcement of Rule 405 by NYSE DisciplinaryAction
Pursuant to its constitution, the New York Stock Exchange may
79. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,748, at 99,273-74
(N.D. Ill.
1970). The Aetna court noted that this policy of free negotiability
of securities indorsed in blank had been expressed in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 8-105, which provides that "[slecurities governed by this Article [Eight] are
negotiable instruments." Id. at 99,274 n.2.
80. Id. It is interesting to note that before negotiating the stolen securities
successfully through defendant broker Paine, Webber, the dishonest customers in
Aetna had attempted unsuccessfully to sell them through two other brokerage
firms. The firm of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., for example, had
refused to do business with the customers "because the certificates were issued and
registered in names other than Baskin and Rabin [the tendering customers], and
because Baskin and Rabin could not supply evidence of owxtership." Id. at 99,272.
The second brokerage firm refused to accept delivery of the securities for the same
reason. Id. at 99,272-73. Although the facts are not entirely clear, it appears
that the defendant Paine, Webber accepted delivery of the stock certificates without making an investigation at all of the tendering customers. Yet the Aetna
court indicated that this failure would not constiute a violation of rule 405. Id.
at 99,272-74.
81. Id. at 99,273.
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expel or suspend any individual member or member firm for violating the stock exchange rules or the Exchange Act and SEC rules, or

for displaying conduct "inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade."82 When a member is suspended or expelled, all the
rights and privileges of membership are terminated.8 3 Where the
suspension or expulsion of a member would be for a period of not

more than five years, a fine or censure may be imposed instead.' 4
Under its rule 345, furthermore, the New York Stock Exchange can
discipline or even fire the representatives or employees of member
firms for violations of the Exchange Act, SEC rules, NYSE rules or

for conduct "inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
85

trade.
While the NYSE constitution and rules do have provisions for
disciplining members and their representatives who violate the Exchange's rules, these provisions and their enforcement do not provide
any relief to parties injured by customers' fraud in the NYSE securi-

ties markets. First, stock exchange rules have only a deterrent effect on the brokers' misconduct. The disciplinary measures of the
Exchange, like those of the SEC, offer no means for monetary compensation to injured investors or other damaged parties. Moreover,
the New York Stock Exchange has proven reluctant to enforce the
severe sanctions of suspension or expulsion against its members and
member firms.8 While the Exchange has shown some willingness
82. N.Y. Stock Exch. Const. art. XIV, § 6, 7, reprinted in CCH N.Y.
STocK ExcH. GUIDE
1656-57 (1972). The power and duty of the NYSE to
discipline its members emanates from section 6(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(b) (1970). See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
83. N.Y. Stock Exch. Const. art. XIV, § 20, reprinted in CCH N.Y. STOCK
ExcH. Gump
1670 (1972). If a member firm or corporation is suspended or
expelled, furthermore, any exchange member who is a general partner in the firm
or a holder of voting stock in the corporation is also suspended or expelled.
Id. § 22, reprinted in CCH N.Y. STOCK ExciH. GUIDE § 1672 (1972).
84. Id. art. XIV, § 13, reprinted in CCH N.Y. STOCK ExCH. GumE 1 1663
(1972). The monetary limits for such fines are $25,000 for exchange members
and $100,000 for member firms or corporations. Id.
85. CCH N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE 1 2345 (1972). See N.Y. STOCK ExcH.,
SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 39, at 18-19.
86. See Special Study, pt. 1, at .320-21. See also 2 Loss 1179-83; Jennings,
supra note 40, at 682-84. During the period from January 1, 1957, to September
30, 1962, only seven of the sixty-six disciplinary proceedings involving members,
allied members, or member organizations charged violations of rules concerning
selling practices; and of these, six concerned violations of the know-your-customer
rule which, according to the Special Study, were "based upon failures to protect the
firm from improper activities of customers." Special Study, pt. 1, at 320. It is
interesting to note that courts have recognized causes of action for damages by
private parties against the exchanges to force the exchanges to enforce their rules
against alleged violators. See note 216 infra.
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to suspend or expel a single representative or employee, such action
is of little benefit to the damaged party. 87 Many violations of the
"know your customer" rule, furthermore, are simply not detected by
the Exchange and thus the threat of discipline for rule violations as
well as the actual deterrent effect arising from complete enforcement

and discipline is substantially diluted. 88 In sum, the Exchange's
enforcement and disciplinary measures regarding the duties of rule
405 do not appear sufficient to protect investors or other persons injured by fraudulent securities transactions conducted through members of the New York Stock Exchange.
REMEDIES FOR CONVERSION AND WRONGFUL TRANSFER OF
SECURITIES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Although the UCC offers no protection to the owner of misappropriated funds against customers' fraud in the securities exchange

markets,8 9 it does provide two basic remedies which the rightful

87. See Special Study, pt. 1, at 320.
88. See id. at 316-20; Jennings, supra note 40, at 682.
89. Article Eight was drafted initially in 1951 and enacted in almost every
state during the following decade. See ALl, Report No. I of the Permanent
Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code (Oct. 31, 1962). Article Eight
is intended to be a negotiable instruments law "dealing with" securities. UNIORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-101, Comment. Article Eight covers the negotiation and
transfer of: (1) bearer bonds, which were formerly covered by the UNIFORM
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW, (2)

registered bonds (not previously covered by

any uniform law), (3) stock certificates, which were formerly covered by the
UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT, and (4) other types of investment paper not
previously covered by any uniform law. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-101,
Comment. See Israels, Investment Securities in New York: Statutory Text and
CommercialPractice,48 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 108-11 (1962).
Since the UCC covers the transfer of "investment securities" only, it offers
remedies for the original owner of misappropriated securities but accords no corresponding relief to the rightful owner of funds which are embezzled and used to
buy securities through a broker. The owner of misappropriated or stolen funds
does have several possible remedies under common law against a party, including
a broker, who wrongfully possesses the funds: an action at law for conversion,
and suits in equity for replevin or for the imposition of a constructive trust.
These remedies are of limited utility, however, since they normally can be asserted
only if the funds can be traced and identified in the hands of the broker as the
identical funds belonging to the original owner. For cases involving replevin
suits to regain possession of misappropriated money, see, e.g., Spear v. Arkansas
Nat'l Bank, 111 Ark. 29, 163 S.W. 508 (1914); 1967 Senior Class v. Thorp,
261 Iowa 539, 154 N.W.2d 874 (1967); Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y v. Branch,
32 App. Div. 2d 959, 302 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1969). For cases involving actions for
conversion of funds, see, e.g., Garras v. Bekiares, 315 Mich. 141, 23 N.W.2d 239
(1946); Clearview Associates v. Clearview Gardens First Corp., 285 App. Div.
969, 139 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1955); Laurent v. Williamsburgh Say. Bank, 28 Misc. 2d
140, 137 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1954); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 927 (1953); W. PROSSER, supra
note 17, at 79-97; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 17, §§ 222A-242. Fur-
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owner of misappropriated securities can assert against a broker who
negotiates the securities. First, Article Eight of the UCC establishes an action for wrongful transfer of securities, which is viable

against all parties except a "bona fide purchaser." 9

Second, the

owner may assert an action for damages for conversion which has

been carried over from the common law and against which the UCC
has codified a special "good faith" defense for brokers.9 1 Under re-

cent judicial construction of these remedies, compliance with the
"know your customer" rule is necessary for the establishment by an
NYSE broker of either the "bona fide purchaser" or the "good

faith" defense.9 2
Remedies of Rightful Owner Under Pre-UCCLaw
At common law, the original owner of stolen securities had two
basic remedies against a wrongful converter and any subsequent innocent purchaser from the converter: an action in tort for conversion and a suit for replevin to regain possession of misappropri-

ated securities or to recover incidental damages. 93 As a general
rule, a purchaser of stolen personal property, who may have acted in
good faith, did not acquire good title and was liable to the true
thermore, if misappropriated funds can be traced, a constructive trust in favor
of the true owner can be placed on the funds or identifiable proceeds, and the
wrongful possessor will be deemed a trustee with power and duty to convey the
stolen or misappropriated property to the original owner. See, e.g., Newton v.
Porter, 69 N.Y. 133 (1887); G. BOGERT, LAw OF TRusTs AND TRusmEs §§ 77, 81
(4th ed. 1963); A. Scor; TRusTs §§ 461-81, 507-22 (1967); REsTATEmENT oF
REsTrrunoN § 160 (1937). Finally, the injured owner may also bring a suit for
restitution against the wrongful possessor for any losses he incurred. See id.
§§ 128-38. In addition to the problem of tracing the particular funds once they
have been placed in the hands of the broker who trades securities on behalf of the
defrauding customer, all of these common law remedies against the broker for
wrongful possession of funds are limited further because of the doctrine that a
"bona fide purchaser" of the funds, which includes a broker who takes delivery in
good faith and without notice of adverse claims, will not be liable to the original
owner. See REsTATEmNT (SEcoND), supra note 17, §§ 231, 233 (1965). See note
95 infra and accompanying text.
90. UNWORM COMnMMRIL CODE§ 8-315 (1972).

91. Id. § 8-318.
92. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219,
234 N.E.2d 230, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1967), modified on other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d
672, 238 N.E.2d 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619, 318 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 8-304, 8-318, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1964); Israels,
How To Handle Transfers of Stock, Bonds and Other Investment Securities, 19
Bus. LAw. 90, 98-99 (1963).
93. See Annot., 20 A.L.R. 132 (1921); 53 Am. Ju. Trover and Conversion
§ 41 (1945).
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owner under either a conversion or replevin cause of action.91 The
common law and early negotiable instrument statutes did, however,

recognize that a purchaser of a negotiable instrument for value and
in good faith without notice of adverse claims (the "bona fide purchaser") was deemed to take good title even from a thief and was
protected, therefore, in an action for damages for the conversion."
The bona fide purchaser exception was also available to brokers

who sold negotiable securities on behalf of their principals. 96 Thus,
a broker would not be liable to the true owner for conversion by
the sale of negotiable securities in good faith and in the ordinary

course of business, where the surrounding circumstances were not

such as to put a reasonably prudent man on notice of adverse
claims.9 7 This "bona fide purchaser" defense for brokers who sold
negotiable securities was preserved in the pre-UCC statutory lawnamely, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act.98
Remedies of Rightful Owner and Broker's Defenses Under the UCC
Summary of UCC remedies. Article Eight of the UCC, which

was adopted in almost every state in the 1960's to regulate the transfer, negotiation and registration (with corporations) of "investment

securities," 99 supports two basic remedies for the original owner of
94. See, e.g., Swim v. Wilson, 90 Cal. 126, 27 P. 33 (1891); Kimball v.
Billings, 55 Me. 147, 92 Am. Dec. 581 (1867); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 223, 234 N.E.2d 230, 233, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 63
(1967), modified on other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 672, 238 N.E.2d 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d
366 (1968).
95. See, e.g., Eulette v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 101 So. 2d
603 (Fla. 1958); Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661 (1918); Spooner
v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503, 3 Am. Rep. 491 (1869); Gruntal v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930); Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1342
(1930).
96. See note 95 supra.
97. See Gruntal v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173
N.E. 682 (1930). See also Israels, supra note 92, at 98. Cf. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Goetz, 285 N.Y. 74, 32 N.E.2d 798 (1941) (a broker's failure to make
an investigation of his customer constitutes evidence from which a jury could infer
notice of possible adverse claims).
98. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d
219, 224, 234 N.E.2d 230, 234, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 64 (1967), modified on other
grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 672, 238 N.E.2d 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968) (involving
Uniform Stock Transfer Act).
99. See generally Bunn, Article 8-A Law for the Transfer of Investment
Securities, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 339; Folk, Article Eight: Investment Securities,
44 N.C.L. Rnv. 654 (1966); Guttman, Article 8-Investment Securities, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 136 (1962); Israels, Article 8-Investment Securities as Negotiable
Paper-Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 Bus. LAw 676 (1958);
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misappropriated securities: an action for the wrongful transfer of
securities under section 8-315100 and an action for damages for con-

version. 1 1 Under section 8-315, a rightful owner of securities may
sue anyone, except a "bona fide purchaser," for wrongful transfer

of securities in order to reclaim possession of the securities, receive
equivalent securities, or secure damages.10 2

Although qualification

as a bona fide purchaser is generally a defense against the action for
wrongful transfer, section 8-315 provides that in cases of an unauthorized indorsement, the owner may reclaim or obtain possession
of the securities (but presumably not recover damages) against even
a bona fide purchaser who has not yet received new, reissued, or re-

registered securities upon registration of transfer by the issuer. 103
Israels, Investment Securities, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 249 (1952). According
to the broad definition provided in the UCC, a "security" essentially is an instrument in bearer or registered form which evidences an ownership interest in property or an enterprise or evidences an issuer's obligation, and which is a type of
instrument "commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly
recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-102(1)(a). This definition is sufficiently broad to parallel the definitions of "security" in the federal securities laws,
namely section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970),
and section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, id. § 78c(a)(10); see Folk, Investment
Securities, supra, at 655-67. The official comments state that "[tihe definition of
'security' is functional rather than formal, and it is believed will cover anything
which the securities markets, including not only the organized exchanges but as
well the 'over-the-counter' markets, are likely to regard as suitable for trading."
UNIFORM .COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-102, Comment. See also Folk, Article Eight:
A Premise and Three Problems, 65 MIcH. L. Rnv. 1379, 1387-89 (1967), where the
author points out some of the deficiencies of Article Eight's definition of security
with respect to the negotiability of new types of securities and securities negotiable
by contract.
100. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-315

("action against purchaser based

upon wrongful transfer").
101. See id. § 8-318 (establishing broker's "good faith" defense against liability for conversion). See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
102. Section 8-315(1) states:
Any person against whom the transfer of a security is wrongful for any
reason, including his incapacity, may against anyone except a bona fide
purchaser reclaim possession of the security or obtain possession of any
new security evidencing all or part of the same rights or have damages.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-315(1).
The official comments recognize that § 8-315 has carried over into the UCC "the
general rule permitting an owner to reclaim possession of a security wrongfully
transferred," and that "an exception is made, as in the prior law, in favor of bona
fide purchasers." Id., Comment 1.
103. Section 8-315(2) stipulates:
If the transfer is wrongful because of an unauthorized indorsement, the
owner may also reclaim or obtain possession of the security or new security even from a bona fide purchaser if the ineffectiveness of the purported indorsement can be asserted against him under the provisions of
this Article on unauthorized indorsements (Section 8-311). Id. § 8-315
(2).
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Rather than suing a broker for wrongful transfer under section
8-315 of the UCC, an owner of misappropriated securities may also
avail himself of a second remedy-the action for damages for con-

version, which existed originally under common law. Although
there is no specific codification of the remedy in the UCC itself, the
official comments state that the common law action for damages
for conversion was not intended to be preempted by the UCC. °4
Hence the common law conversion remedy co-exists with the UCC,
except that the UCC has codified a special "good faith" defense
under section 8-318 available to brokers as "agents" or "bailees."'' 05
Since enactment of the UCC, therefore, the rightful owner of
misappropriated securities can successfully maintain against a broker
either an action under section 8-315 to reclaim or obtain possession
of securities, or an action for damages for conversion. However, if
the broker can establish that he took delivery of the securities as a

"bona fide purchaser," he will normally have a defense against either
remedy. Furthermore, if the broker can successfully invoke the
statutory "good faith" defense designed especially for brokers, he
will have an additional defense against an action for conversion.
The "bona fide purchaser" defense. In the interest of promot-

ing the negotiability of investment securities, the UCC has preserved
the protected status of the "bona fide purchaser," and made it
available to brokers as well as other parties. 1°6 As discussed earlier,
Section 8-311 provides, in turn, that the owner may not assert the ineffectiveness
of an indorsement against a bona fide purchaser who has "received a new, reissued or re-registered security on registration of transfer" by the issuer. Id.
§ 8-311. The theory behind section 8-311's protection for a bona fide purchaser
who has received a new, re-issued or re-registered security on transfer is that "the
purchaser who normally receives [from a broker] and sees only a certificate registered in his own name cannot realistically be held to have notice of or to have
relied upon a forged or unauthorized indorsement on the original security transferred." Id. § 8-311, Comment 1.
104. The Comments state that the section 8-315 action for wrongful transfer
"deals only with the owner's right to reclaim possession of the security and is not
intended to exclude any rights he may have to damages for conversion under the
case law." Id. § 8-315, Comment 2.
105. Id. § 8-318.
106. The UCO defines a "broker" as "a person engaged for all or part of his
time in the business of buying and selling scurities, who in the transactions concerned acts for, or buys a security from or sells a security to a customer." Id.
§ 8-304 (emphasis added). The official comment to this section recognizes that
"Etihe differentiation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 between 'broker'
and 'dealer' is of no significance under" Article Eight. Id., Comment.
Section 8-304 expressly recognizes that a "purchaser" includes a "broker for
the seller or buyer . . .

."

Id. § 8-304.

The Comment to section 8-302 (definition

of "bona fide purchaser") indicates that a broker may be a bona fide purchaser.
Id. § 8-302, Comment. See Comment, The Status of an Investment Security
Holder Under Article 8, 33 FoRD.L. REv. 466 (1965).
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qualification as a bona fide purchaser will provide a broker with an
absolute defense against a common law conversion action and a nearabsolute defense against an owner's suit under UCC section 8-315
for reclamation or repossession based upon the wrongful transfer
07
of securities.1
A "bona fide purchaser" is defined in section 8-302 of the
UCC as a purchaser who takes proper delivery of securities for value

in good faith without notice of any adverse claims. 108 It is with
107. See notes 102-03, 105 supra and accompanying text. In addition to acquiring these specific defenses, the bona fide purchaser takes, upon delivery, "all
the rights in the security which his transferor had," including ownership, and
"acquires the security free of any adverse claims." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 8-301. It should be pointed out that the injured owner of stolen securities still
has a potential remedy under the UCC against the issuer even though the broker
as a bona fide purchaser is not liable under sections 8-315 or 8-318. Under section 8-404, where an issuer has "registered a transfer of a security to a person not
entitled to it," the true owner can obtain an equivalent security from the issuer
upon demand, unless: (1) the security had the necessary indorsements on it;, or
(2) the issuer had no duty to inquire into adverse claims when the security was
presented for registration under section 8-403; or (3) the owner had not perfected
his rights by notifying the issuer within a reasonable time after having notice of
the wrongful transfer under section 8-405(1); or (4) delivery of the security would
result in overissue. Id. § 8-403 to -405(1). Furthermore, where a security is lost,
apparently destroyed or wrongfully taken and the owner notifies the issuer of that
fact within a reasonable time after he has notice of it, the issuer generally must
issue a new security if the rightful owner "so requests before the issuer has notice
that the security has been acquired by a bona fide purchaser . .

. ."

Id. § 8-405

(2). See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 10 UCC REP.
SERv. 759, 765-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). The corporation is then able, pursuant
to section 8-312, to sue the party guaranteeing the false signature and recover.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-312.
108. Section 8-302 defines a "bona fide purchaser" as "a purchaser for value
in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim who takes delivery of a
security in bearer form or of one in registered form issued to him and endorsed to
him or in blank." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-302. Thus, the definition of
a bona fide purchaser under section 8-302 provides five basic elements for qualification as a bona fide purchaser. The purchaser must pay "value" and take from a
proper "delivery," which is defined as the "voluntary transfer of possession.'
Id. § 1-201(14). He must also take "without notice" of adverse claims and in
"good faith." Finally, unless the security is in bearer form, the purchaser must
obtain the proper indorsement pursuant to section 8-308 of the UCC. See
Folk, Investment Securities, supra note 99, at 691-94; Comment, supra note 106,
at 479-80.
It should be noted that a purchaser, including a broker, makes a guarantee of
the signature of the indorser to a subsequent purchaser pursuant to section 8-312,
and the guarantor is liable to the subsequent purchaser for the breach of warranty.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-312.

The transferor may also give the more expansive guarantee of indorsement
which includes a warranty of the rightfulness of the transfer. Id. § 8-312(2).
These warranties serve to protect subsequent transferees who purchase from a
broker in customers' fraud cases where securities are stolen and negotiated. See
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reference to the "good faith" and "notice" requirements that the

courts have attempted to incorporate the "know your customer"
rule into the bona fide purchaser definition for NYSE brokers.109
What constitutes "good faith," within the meaning of the definition of bona fide purchaser, is a matter of some controversy. On
the one hand, the cross-references in the UCC indicate that a subjective definition--"honesty in fact" in the conduct or transaction
concerned-is to be applied to the definition of bona fide purchaser
in section 8-302 of the UCC. 0o Yet the special "good faith" defense provided in section 8-318 for brokers in conversion suits
states specifically that "good faith" includes the "observance of rea-

sonable commercial standards.""'

Thus, despite the specific cross-

reference in section 8-302 (which defines "bona fide purchaser") to

a narrow, subjective definition of "good faith," it appears that the
drafters envisioned that a professional broker, acting in the course
of his business, could demonstrate "good faith" only by observing

"reasonable commercial standards" in his conduct-a requirement
analogous to that demanded of "merchants" in sales transactions under Article Two of the UCC." 2

Judicial construction of the bona fide purchaser defense, at least
in cases decided under common law and the Uniform Stock Transfer

Act, indicates that the broker must observe "reasonable commercial
standards" in order to demonstrate "good faith.""1 3 Cases involving
NYSE brokers, furthermore, have held that this "reasonable com-

mercial standard" requirement can be discharged properly only by
4
the broker's compliance with the "know your customer" rule."
Folk, Investment Securities, supra note 99, at 692-93; Israels, supra note 92, at
97-98.
109. See note 92 supra.
110. UNIFORM CommEsRcuL Coun § 8-302, Comment, which incorporates the
general UCC definition of "good faith" found in section 1-201(19).
111. Id. § 8-318.
112. Section 2-103 stipulates that "good faith" in the case of a "merchant"
means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade." Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
113. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d
219, 226, 234 N.E.2d 230, 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 66 (1967), modified on other
grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 672, 238 N.W.2d 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968); Gruntal v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930);
Israels, supra note 92, at 97-99; ef. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Goetz,
258 N.Y. 74, 32 N.E.2d 798 (1941). See also Brown v. Rossetti, 8 13CC REP.
SERv., 730 (N.Y. App. T. 1971), where a factor was held to have violated the
good faith proscriptions of § 8-304 on the basis that his transaction was not conducted "in the ordinary course of business."
114. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 226,
234 N.E.2d 230, 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 66 (1967); Fidelity & Deposit Co.
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The New York Court of Appeals in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. WaIston & Co."'5 applied these principles:
It would seem that rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange formulates what are "reasonable commercial standards" in this context
[within the meaning of section 8-318 of the UCCI by requiring a
broker to use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to its
customers. The obligation of a broker selling securities to observe
reasonable commercial standards was expressed by section 8-318 of
the Uniform Commercial Code but was not created by it. The
performance of these duties is an element of what constitutes good
faith under [the Uniform Stock Transfer Act] .... 116
In order to be a bona fide purchaser under section 8-302 of the

UCC, a purchaser must also show that he took delivery of the securities "without notice of any adverse claims."" 7 An examination of
the "notice" requirement reveals that compliance with the "know
your customer" rule-a prerequisite toward a broker's demonstration of "good faith," at least under the pre-UCC case law-may be
a necessary ingredient, also, in the NYSE broker's proof that he
received a security without notice of adverse claims.":8
Pursuant to the UCC's general definition of "notice," a person
will be precluded from qualifying as a bona fide purchaser, whenever

he has actual or constructive notice of an adverse claim."19 Although
v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619, 318 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct.
1970). See also N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 8-304, -318, Practice Commentary (McKinney
1964), note 120 infra.
115. 21 N.Y.2d 219, 234 N.E.2d 230, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1967).
In the
second opinion in Walston the New York Court of Appeals disposed of the case
on another point and did not modify its original position on the relationship of
rule 405 with the NEw YORK UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CONE. In the first Walston
decision, the court denied the defendant broker's claim to a bona fide purchaser
defense on the grounds that the NYSE broker violated rule 405 by failing to investigate thoroughly the identity of a customer who tendered forged stock certificates registered in the name of a fictitious payee. For a discussion of the factual
situation in Walston, see note 77 supra.
116. Id. at 226, 234 N.E.2d at 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 66 (1967) (emphasis
added).
117. UNIFORM COMmRCiAL CODE § 8-302. An "adverse claim" includes "a
claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a particular adverse person
is the owner of or has an interest in the security." Id. § 8-301(1).
118. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-304, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1964). The
New York UCC maintains that a broker will have notice of any adverse claim
which a proper customer investigation under NYSE rule 405 or analogous rules of
other exchanges would have elicited. Id.
119. UNIFORM COMmCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(25), 8-302. The UCC's general
definitions provide that
[a] person has "notice" of a fact when (a) he has actual knowledge of it;
or (b) he has received notice or notification of it; or (c) from all the
facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists. Id. § 1-201(25).
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the UCC codifies in section 8-304 three specific instances where

purchasers will be deemed to have constructive notice of adverse
121
claims,1 20 the official comments state that this list is not exclusive.
According to the UCC's general definition of notice, therefore, a
broker will be deemed to have constructive notice of a fact when
"from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in

question he has reason to know that it exists. '122 As recognized in
the official comments, this means that "suspicious characteristics of
the transaction," such as defects in indorsement, may give a purchaser "reason to know" of adverse claims, particularly if he is "a
1 23
commercially sophisticated purchaser such as a broker."
Both the case law and the official comments to the UCC in
New York indicate that a broker will have constructive notice of
any facts which the observance of reasonable commercial standards,
and hence compliance with the "know your customer" rule, would
have revealed. 1 24 As stated by the Walston court:
Selling brokers cannot shirk these duties [compliance with rule 405 of
the New York Stock Exchange] and at the same time claim to have
acted in good faith without being charged with knowledge of facts
120. Under section 8-304, a purchaser is "charged with notice of adverse claims"
if: (1) the security has been indorsed for some purpose other than transfer;
(2) the security is in bearer form and has on it an unambiguous statement that
the security is not the property of the transferor; (3) where the security is held
by, registered in the name of, or indorsed by a fiduciary and the purchaser has
"knowledge that the proceeds are being used or that the transaction is for the
individual benefit of the fiduciary or otherwise in breach of duty." Id. § 8-304.
The New York UCC appears to limit the instances of constructive "notice
of adverse claims" through the addition to section 8-304 of a special clause which
stipulates that
[e]xcept as provided in this section [8-304], to constitute notice of an adverse claim or a defense, the purchaser must have knowledge of the
claim or defense or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the
security amounts to bad faith. N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-304(3) (McKinney
1964).
The New York courts have construed "bad faith" liberally, however, indicating
that in the case of a broker, an objective test is to be applied-namely, noncompliance with reasonable commercial standards. See notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text. The New York Comment to section 8-304 supports the view of
the New York case law:
The facts gathered in the course of compliance with that rule [405] may
either constitute the "knowledge" described in subsec. (2) [of section
8-304 above, referring to a broker's having knowledge that a fiduciary's
transaction is in breach of trust] or, though short of that, still be sufficient
to raise a question of good faith under subsec. (3) of this section. Id.
§ 8-304, Practice Commentary.
121. UNIFORM COMMERCIL CODE § 8-304, Comment 1.
122. Id. § 1-201(25).
123. Id. § 8-304, Comment 1.
124. N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-304, Practice Commentary (McKinney) (1964); see notes
97, 118, 120 supra and accompanying text.
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which compliance with reasonable commercial standards would have
disclosed.1 25

Consequently, whether one focuses on the element of "good faith"
or "notice," the result appears to be the same: compliance with the
"know your customer" rule is deemed to be satisfaction of reasonable commercial standards and is necessary in order for an NYSE
broker, receiving delivery of securities in the ordinary course of business, to establish his "bona fide purchaser" defense.
Broker's statutory "good faith" defense against conversion
action. In addition to continuing the common law protection accorded a broker as a "bona fide purchaser," the UCC in section 8318 has created a special statutory defense designed to insure the
protection of "innocent" brokers from liability where the original
act of wrongful conversion was committed by the broker's customer.126 Thus, section 8-318 provides that any "agent or bailee"
who in "good faith" has received securities and sold or otherwise disposed of them according to the instructions of his principal is not
liable for conversion, notwithstanding the fact that the principal had
no right to dispose of the securities.' 2 7 Furthermore, where the
agent is "in the business of buying, selling or otherwise dealing with
securities," section 8-318 stipulates that the defense of good faith
1 28
includes the "observance of reasonable commercial standards."'
Accordingly, a broker who disposes of misappropriated securities in
accordance with his customer's instructions will be insulated from liability for his customer's conversion, provided that the broker acted
in "good faith"-which, for purposes of section 8-318, includes
"honesty in fact" and observance of "reasonable commercial stand29
ards.,,1
125. 21 N.Y.2d at 226, 234 N.E.2d at 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
126. UNORM COMMmRCUIL CODE § 8-318. The comments state that this section was intended "to negate the liability of agents, including brokers, and bailees
for innocent conversion or participation in breach of fiduciary duty," id. § 8-318,
Comment, and thereby preserves the "good faith" defense under the pre-UCC
case law enunciated in Gruntal v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 254 N.Y.
468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930). See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
127. The full text of section 8-318 provides:
An agent or bailee who in good faith (including observance of reasonable commercial standards if he is in the business of buying, selling or
otherwise dealing with securities) has received securities and sold, pledged
or delivered them according to the instructions of his principal is not
liable for conversion or for participation in breach of fiduciary duty although the principal had no right to dispose of them. UNIFoRM COMMERcIAL CoDE § 8-318.
128. Id.
129. id. §§ 1-201(19), 8-318. See notes 110-112 supra and accompanying text.
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The available judicial construction of the broker's statutory
"good faith" defense indicates that, at least under New York cases,
the "observance of reasonable commercial standards" requires compliance with the "know your customer" rule. 30 Although Walston
was actually decided under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the
New York Court of Appeals noted with reference to the special
"good faith" defense codified in the UCC:
Even the Uniform Commercial Code.

.

. provides by section 8-318

that the test of good faith of a selling broker includes "observance of
reasonable commercial standards if he is in the business of buying,
selling or otherwise dealing with securities." It would seem that rule
405 of the New York Stock Exchange formulates what are "reasonable commercial standards" in this context by requiring the broker to
use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to its customers. 131

"Reasonable Commercial Standards"--Judicial "Codification" of
Rule 405 into the UCC?
The available case law examining brokers' defenses in actions
for wrongful transfer or conversion of securities indicates that the
"know your customer" rule is becoming an integral part of the Uniform Commercial Code, at least as construed by the courts of New
York. 132 Whenever an NYSE broker is selling securities on behalf of
his customer, compliance with rule 405 appears to be a necessary
incident towards a broker's observance of "reasonable commercial
standards" and hence towards both his qualification as a bona fide
purchaser and the establishment of his section 8-318 "good faith"
defense against liability for conversion.' 33 Conversely, it would
seem that the rightful owner of securities might have a complete
remedy for a broker's violation of rule 405 both in an action under
section 8-315 to assert his adverse claim to possession of misappropriated securities as well as in a conversion action for damages at
common law.
130. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219,
226, 234 N.E.2d 230, 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58, 66 (1967); Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619, 318 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup.
Ct. 1970); N.Y. U.C.C. § 8-318, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1964); cf.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Goetz, 258 N.Y. 74, 32 N.E.2d 798 (1941);
Gruntal v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682
(1930).
131. 21 N.Y.2d at 226, 234 N.E.2d at 235, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
132. See notes 92, 109, 113-16, 124-25, 130-31 supra and accompanying text.
See Folk, A Premise, supra note 99, at 1385-86, for a discussion of the effect of
broker's duties to investigate customers on the negotiability of investment securities
as proposed in Article Eight.
133. See notes 113-16, 124-25 supra and accompanying text.
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The judicial incorporation of rule 405 into the UCC may be
somewhat misleading, however, for the purposes of insuring adequate protection to injured parties against customers' fraud conducted through NYSE brokers. Even if one makes the assumption
that other states will follow the liberal interpretation given the UCC
by the courts of New York, it is still uncertain whether the judicial
codification of rule 405 into the broker's "bona fide purchaser" and
statutory "good faith" defenses under the UCC is actually expanding
the protection otherwise afforded to injured securities owners under
the UCC. Rather, the courts in negotiable securities cases appear
to be using rule 405 only as a more elaborate definition of broker
duties which are already consistent with some fundamental purpose
13 4
underlying the UCC or are already recognized in the prior case law.
In short, the UCC and the fundamental canons of negotiable instrument law appear to be defining the scope of rule 405, rather than
vice versa.
Thus, the protection of an injured owner of embezzled property against customers' fraud in the securities exchange markets is
still a function, in a state cause of action, of the limitations which are
deeply embedded in the UCC. The defrauded owner of stolen securities who had indorsed them in blank, for example, has no viable
remedy against the passive broker, absent some special circumstances
imparting to the broker constructive notice of adverse claims. 13
With the added fact that the UCC provides no relief against brokers
for the owner of misappropriated funds, as opposed to securities, it
would appear that adequate protection of the investing public from
customers' fraud effectuated through NYSE brokers can be found
only in sources other than the state law of negotiable instruments.
CvM LABILiTy UNDER RULE

IlOB-5

Many persons who have been injured by fraudulent securities
transactions between brokers and their dishonest customers have
brought private damage actions against brokers under the primary
anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act-notably section 10(b)' 30
and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 137 Under rule 10b-5, it is
134. See notes 74-81 supra and accompanying text.
135. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,748 (N.D. Ill. 1970); see notes 79-81
supra and accompanying text.

136. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972). Many private damage actions are brought
under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which applies to fraudulent "offers"
or "sales" in interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1970). See, e.g., Buttrey v.
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unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of

any security, to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,"
or to "engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person."'' 13 The
existence of a private cause of action for damages under rule 1Ob-5
was recognized in the landmark case, Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 3 9 and this remedy has developed substantially in the subse-

quent twenty-seven years,14 0 gaining Supreme Court recognition in
the 1971 case Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 136 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 838 (1969); Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
1 93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Barnes v. Peat, Marwick & Mitchell, [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,511 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). But see Dyer v.
Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971) (holding that there
is no implied cause of action for damages under section 17(a) of the Securities Act).
138. The full text of rule lOb-5 is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (1972).
139. 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946), modified, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified, 83 F.
Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
140. See generally Henkel, Codification-Civil Liability Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 866 (1967); Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule
lOb-5-a Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964); Klein, The Extension of a Private
Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 20 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 81 (1965); Ruder, Civil Liability, supra note 24, at 642-60; Comment, The
Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59
YALE LJ. 1120 (1950). Some commentators have argued convincingly that Congress never intended to create a private cause of action under rule lob-5. See
Ruder, Civil Liability, supra note 24. The courts, however, have shown no inclination to retrench from the holding in Kardon and continue to recognize the existence
of a private right of action under rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270 (1961), dismissal aff'd, 328 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
Private suits under the rule now constitute the most important part of the rule's
development. See BROMBERG § 8.1, at 194. Fully one third of the litigation under
the Exchange Act is under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, id. § 2.5(b), at 45, and a
large percentage of these actions are private. As stated by the Fifth Circuit in Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970), "[t]he volume of private litigation under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 has increased spectacularly in recent years." Id.
at 804.
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Life and Casualty Co.14'
In order to sustain a private action for damages under rule

lOb-5, claimants have been faced with a varying array of elements
of proof. 142

Foremost among the potential barriers to rule 10b-5

recovery against brokers in the customers' fraud area are:

the

purchaser/seller standing requirement, 1 43 the need to .prove sci-

enter,14 4 and the frequent necessity of imputing liability to brokerage
141. 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). See Note, Bankers Life: Paying for a Corporation by Selling Its Securities Violates 10b-5, 1972 DuKE L.J. 465.
142. Traditionally claimants in civil suits under 10b-5 have had to establish
several elements of proof in order to recover. The degree to which these elements
need be proved has been the subject of much discussion and judicial narration in
recent years. See DeLancey, Rule lOb-S-A Recent Profile, 13 CORP. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 1 (1971-72); Lystra, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 10 CORP. PRAc.
COMMENTATOR 81 (1968-69); Ruder & Cross; Note, Rule 10b-5: Elements in a Private Right of Action, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 541 (1968). There seems to be some connection between the strictness with which courts require these elements to be proved and
the particular policies which the courts endeavor to protect. Note, Banker's Life,
supra note 141, at 471 n.38. These elements, some of which are traditional fraud
requirements, include scienter, reliance, privity, standing as a purchaser or seller,
causation and materiality (which is not of major concern in cases involving
customers' fraudulent transactions). See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner
& Smith, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,714 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), BROMBERG
§§ 8.1-8.7; Ruder & Cross 1126. Privity has been rejected as a necessary
requirement in civil suits under 10b-5. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Kline v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp.
94, 104 (N.D. Ill. 1967); BROMBERG § 8.5; DeLancey, supra, at 20; Ruder,
Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privily and State of Mind in Rule
10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 423 (1968); Comment,
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing
the Doctrine of Privily, 74 YALs LJ. 658 (1965). "Positive Proof of Reliance,"
according to the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), "is not a prerequisite to recovery," at least in cases alleging a failure to disclose material facts (by an insider). See generally BROMBERG § 8.6; Meisenholder, Scienter and Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Suits Against
Seller Under Rule 10b-5, 4 CORP. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 27 (1963); Ruder, Civil Liability, supra note 140, at 627 (1963); Note, Bankers Life, supra note 141, at 471 n.41;
DeLancey, supra at 24-26. Nor must reliance be proved even in nondisclosure
cases where insiders trade securities even in anonymous transactions conducted
through the national securities exchanges. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,714 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In cases
involving -an insider's misrepresentation of or failure to disclose material facts
causation must also be proved. See BROMBERG § 8.7; DeLancey, supra, at 26-33.
However, both causation and reliance, like materiality, are not important elements
in the type of 10b-5 violations by brokers discussed in this comment. The major
elements which potentially limit recovery in civil actions under 10b-5 against
brokers in cases involving customers' fraudulent securities transactions are the
purchaser-seller requirement and scienter.
143. See notes 146-48 infra and accompanying text.
144. See notes 156-71 infra and accompanying text.
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firms for the rule 1Ob-5 violations of their local representatives. 14"
The purpose of this section is to analyze the effect of these three
145. See notes 172-86 infra and accompanying text. Characterization of the
typical "customers' fraud" scheme (misappropriation of securities or funds and
their subsequent use by a customer in a securities transaction conducted through a
broker, see notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text) as a fraudulent scheme or
practice "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security, and hence as the
type of transaction which in fact constitutes a violation of rule 10b-5, generally
has not been a problem. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Bush v.
Bruns Nordeman & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (both
cases recognizing a valid cause of action under rule lob-5 against brokers who
consummate securities transactions for customers who are investing with misappropriated funds). This seems especially true after the apparently permissive position taken by the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), with reference to the types of transactions which violate
rule 10b-5. See Note, Bankers Life, supra note 141, at 475-80; Note, Securities
Regulation-A Little Light and More Obfuscation on Rule 10b-5, 50 N.C.L. REv.
706, 709-10 (1972). In Bankers Life, the Bankers Life & Casualty Co., the sole
shareholder of Manhattan Casualty Co., sold its entire common stock interest in
Manhattan for five million dollars. The purchaser, Begole, took control of Manhattan, forced Manhattan to sell five million dollars worth of U.S. treasury bonds,
and then used the proceeds of the bonds to finance his original common stock purchase. 404 U.S. at 7-8. After Manhattan was driven into bankruptcy, the superintendent of insurance brought a rule 10b-5 action on behalf of Manhattan's creditors against Begole and Bankers Life, alleging that Manhattan had been defrauded
by the sale of Manhattan's treasury bonds and by Bankers Life's sale of Manhattan common stock. Id. at 13 n.10. The Second Circuit affirmed a district
court dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the treasury-bond sales transaction itself was not tainted with fraud since the purchaser paid the full and fair
market price. Rather, according to the Second Circuit, the only fraud in the case
lay in the subsequent misappropriation of the proceeds by an insider, an act involving waste of corporate assets and not cognizable under a federal cause of action based on a violation of rule lOb-5. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g, 300 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Note, supra note 141, at 469. However, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that a valid cause of action was stated since Manhattan, as
a "seller" of its treasury bonds, was deprived of the proceeds of the sale because
of the "deceptive device" of an insider who misappropriated the proceeds. 404
U.S. at 9-10. The Court stated:
Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.
Since there was a "sale" of a security and since fraud was used "in
connection with" it, there is redress under § 10(b) . . . . The crux of
the present case is that Manhattan suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor. Id. at
12-13 (emphasis added).
Thus, Bankers Life is valuable in the customers' fraud area since it teaches
that rule lOb-5 covers fraudulent practices which only "incidentally involve," or
"touch" the actual securities transaction-practices such as the insider's integrated
scheme in Bankers Life to sell securities owned by his corporation and then embezzle the proceeds of sale. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 93,816 n.8 (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 1972); Note, supra
note 141, at 475-76, The Supreme Court's approach in Bankers Life seems to
indicate that the typical "customers' fraud" transaction, wherein securities funds
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limitations on the viability of rule 10b-5 relief for the rightful owners of misappropriated securities or funds who are injured by fraudu-

lent schemes effectuated because of the failure of brokers to investigate their customers properly.
Purchaser/Seller Standing Requirement

The Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co.146 interpreted rule 10b-5's proscription against fraudulent schemes "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security to require that a
claimant be an actual purchaser or seller of securities in order to
have standing to bring a private damage action under rule 10b-5.147
While this standing requirement has been mitigated somewhat by
permissive interpretation given the terms "purchaser" and "seller"
by many courts since Birnbaum, the purchaser/seller requirement
148
in civil suits under rule 1Ob-5 remains viable.

are fraudulently misappropriated from their rightful owner and used as part of a
securities transaction effectuated through a broker, can be viewed as a fraudulent
scheme "in connection with" the customer's purchase or sale of securities through
the broker. Thus, the customers' fraud transaction is the type of scheme which
constitutes a violation of rule 10b-5. Consequently, a broker potentially can be
held liable under rule lOb-5 to the rightful owner of misappropriated property,
provided that the various elements of proof can be established. 'See notes 142-44
supra and accompanying text.
146. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); accord,
O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
147. The commentators, however, have severely criticized the Birnbaum purchaser-seller limitation on standing to bring a rule 10b-5 suit. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA.
L. RFv. 268 (1968); Ruder, CurrentDevelopments in the FederalLaw of Corporate
Fiduciary Relationships-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289
(1971); Comment, The Purchaser-SellerRule: An Archaic Tool for Determining
Standing under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEo. L.J. 1177 (1968); Comment, SEC Rule
X-lOb-5: Guided Missile or Flying Saucer?, 32 Tmx. L. Rlv. 197, 206 (1953);
Comment, Private Enforcement under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction for a Corporate
Issuer?, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 618, 622-23 (1967); Note, The PurchaserSeller Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L. Rnv. 684, 697-99 (1968); Note, Civil Liability
Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REv. 537, 570-71 (1956).
148. See Note, supra note 141, at 479-80. The courts have carved out
several exceptions to the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement for standing
under rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967) (standing given to minority shareholders to enjoin controlling stockholder from depressing the price of corporation's stock by
market manipulation); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 & n.3
(2d Cir. 1967) (standing given to broker in action against purchasers who had
ordered securities from him intending to pay for them only if their value rose);
Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967) (short form merger constituted a "constructive" sale of plaintiff's securities, although plaintiff had not parted with his stock); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (shareholders in a target

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1973:489

In the area of customers' fraud, the rightful owner of misappropriated securities or funds ostensibly is neither a purchaser nor
seller of the securities which a defrauding customer negotiates
through the broker.' 49 The courts in customers' fraud cases nevertheless have had no difficulty in finding that injured owners of converted securities or funds have the requisite standing to sue under
rule lOb-5, as evidenced by the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Buttrey.150 In Buttrey, the trustee in bankruptcy of a bankrupt securities dealer, Dobich Securities Corp., brought a rule 1Ob-5
action for damages against the Merrill Lynch brokerage firm on the
grounds that Merrill Lynch knew, or should have known, that its cuscorporation who have not tendered or "sold" their shares nevertheless have standing
to sue for temporary restraining order under rule lOb-5 against persons who have
violated the rule in connection with the making of a tender offer).
149. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
150. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). Similarly, in
the remaining two customers' fraud cases brought against brokers under rule l0b-5,
Bush v. Bums Nordeman & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,674 (S.D.N.Y,
1972) and Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [19691970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. % 92,748 (N.D. Ill. 1970), the
standing of the injured owner as a "purchaser" or "seller" has not been a problem.
In Bush, a case involving the fraudulent purchase of securities through an NYSE
broker with misappropriated funds, the standing question was raised only with
reference to the right of a trustee in bankruptcy to sue under rule 10b-5 on behalf
of defrauded creditors. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. at % 93,674 at 93,007. See
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 & n.8 (1971);
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 144 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). In the Aetna case involving the negotiation of stolen securities through an NYSE broker, the question of the rightful
owner's standing to sue the broker under rule 10b-5 was apparently not even
raised.
A liberal approach to standing in suits based on customers' fraud or on other
rule 10b-5 violations conceivably is marked by the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In
Bankers Life, the Court did not pass judgment expressly on the validity of the
Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement because the Court apparently found, on the
basis of the facts before it, that plaintiff did qualify as a "seller" of securities in
the strict Birnbaum sense. The Bankers Life decision can be interpreted, however,
as portending a more flexible approach to the purchaser-seller requirement in the
future. See Note, supra note 141, at 479-80. This should be true at least
in cases like Bankers Life itself, where there is a misappropriation of sales
proceeds in connection with the sale of securities-a factual situation not altogether dissimilar to the typical customers' fraud transaction. See notes 13-14 supra
and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit has stated recently:
Bankers Life must, therefore, be read as a mandate for a broad interpretation of Section 10(b). And while it does not expressly overrule
Birnbaum, it generally reinforces the trend in federal courts away from a
strict application of the purchaser-seller rule. Vincent v. Moench, 473
F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1973).
See generally Comment, The Birabaum Doctrine Revisted: Standing to Sue Under
Rule 10b-5 Analyzed, 37 Mo. L. REv. 481 (1972); Note, The Purchaser-Seller
Requirement of Rule lob-5 Reevaluated, 44 CoLo. L. REv. 151 (1972).
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tomer, an officer of the bankrupt, was using fraudulently converted
funds in his securities transactions with Merrill Lynch. 151 Suing as a
representative of the bankrupt's defrauded customers, the trustee alleged in his complaint that the "natural result of such course of business by the defendant operated as a fraud" upon the bankrupt in
violation of rule 10b-5.1 52 The Seventh Circuit held that the rule
lOb-5 suit should proceed against a motion for summary judgment,
stating:
Defendant asserts that the only sales relevant to any violation of
. . . Rule lOb-5 are those between the bankrupt and defendant
[Merrill Lynch]. From this, defendant reasons that since there are
no allegations that Merrill Lynch defrauded the bankrupt in connection with these sales, there can be no predicate for violation of the
Securities Act. . . . Without entering the debate as to the precise
status of defendant as a "buyer" or a "seller," we are persuaded that
[the complaint] sufficiently alleges that defendant benefited by a
course of business which operated as a fraud upon the bankrupt's customers to entitle those customers, through the trustee in bankruptcy,
to recover the net transfers of the funds so converted. 153
In customers' fraud cases under rule lOb-5, therefore, the de-

termination of standing is based on whether the "natural result" of
defendant broker's conduct, in failing to prevent a 'customer's
fraudulent scheme, operated as a fraud upon the rightful owner of

the misappropriated funds or securities. 15 4 Assuming that this caus151. 410 F.2d at 144. For a discussion of the factual situation in Buttrey,
see note 68 supra.
152. 410 F.2d at 137.
153. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
154. See id. at 137 & 144. Although the Seventh Circuit in Buttrey did not
consider whether its result was supposed to be consistent with, or create an exception from, the traditional Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirements, the language
used by the court in Buttrey (an action for damages) is suggestive of the approach
taken by some courts in viewing "causation" as a substitute for the classic standing
requirements in suits for equitable relief. Causation has generally been viewed as
a separate element of proof in rule lOb-5 cases, see note 142 supra, whereby the
injury of the claimants must in some way be the result of the fraudulent or misleading actions of the defendants, from both a factual and legal point of view.
See DeLancey, supra note 142, at 26-29; Ruder & Cross 1138-39. While the element of causation has been important primarily in misrepresentation cases,
the concept of causation has been used by several federal circuits, at least
in suits for equitable relief, as a means for determining whether a claimant
should have standing to sue under rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench,
473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d
Cir. 1970) (suit for injunctive relief); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 1969) (suit for injunctive relief); Tully v. Mott
Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 850 (D.N.J. 1972) (suit for injunctive relief).
In the Vincent case, for example, one family with a 49% interest in a partnership sought "private equitable relief" (presumably recission) under rule lOb-5 against
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al connection will be satisfied in the typical customers' fraud case,
the owner of embezzled property can be viewed as having standing
as either a constructive "purchaser" or "seller" of securities, depend-

ing on whether the embezzled property constitutes funds or securities, respectively. 1 1
Requirement of the Proof of Scienter
A second element of proof in a rule lOb-5 cause of action,
establishing the existence of scienter on the part of the defendant,
poses a substantial obstacle towards recovery against brokers who
fail to investigate their customers diligently in violation of rule 405.
At common law, a plaintiff in an action for fraud or misrepresentation had to prove that the defendant possessed an intent to deceive,

to mislead or to convey a false impression.'" One aspect of this
element of proof of fraudulent intent was scienter-the existence of
actual knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the falsity of a misrepresentation or the fraudulent nature of a particular scheme.',
While most courts have determined that the plaintiff need not
prove fraud or specific intent to deceive in the strictest common law
sense in order to recover under rule 10b-5, there is some confusion
among the federal circuits as to the exact degree of scienter, if any,
which is necessary to support a valid private cause of action for
damages under rule 10b-5.15 8 At least two principles appear to be

well-established. First, rule 10b-5 liability can certainly be imposed
another 49% owner who allegedly used a fraudulent scheme to purchase from a
third party the remaining 2% interest in the partnership and then coerce the plaintiffs to sell their 49% interest. The Tenth Circuit stated, in dictum, that claimants
would have standing to sue under the rule if there was a "causal connection" between the fraudulent securities sale and the claimant's injury:
Section 10(b)'s language outlawing deception or manipulation "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" must be construed as
meaning that in a suit for equitable relief any person showing a "causal
connection" between the fraudulent sale of a security and injury to himself
may invoke federal jurisdiction ....
The plaintiffs were not a party or privy to this transaction, but they
claim to have been injured as a result of the effectuation of the scheme.
In the final analysis, we have a scheme, a sale, and an injury, but this does
not spell jurisdiction. The question is whether there is a causal connection
between the deceptive sale and the injury to the plaintiffs ....
Vincent
v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434-35 (10th Cir. 1973).
155. Cf. note 148 supra and accompanying text.
156. See BROMBERG § 8.4; W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 107; Bucklo 571-75;
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 531 (1938).
157. Bucklo 572.
158. See, e.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 278-88
(3d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,682, at 93,035-36 & n.7 (D. Del. 1972); JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURrIES
REGULATION 1070-72 (3d ed. 1972); Ruder & Cross 1140-42.
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where the defendant had actual knowledge of a fraudulent scheme,
even though he had no specific intent to further it. 1' 9 Second, there

is a substantial line of cases in which a defendant's misconduct has
been so egregious or reckless that knowledge of the fraudulent nature
of a transaction has been imputed.1"' In the Buttrey case, for example, a broker was alleged to have demonstrated "callous disregard" for his duties under the "know your customer" rule by con-

summating securities transactions for a financially irresponsible securities dealer who had a well-known history of engaging in large,

speculatory investment schemes. 161 The Seventh Circuit held that
the broker's misconduct would be actionable under rule lOb-5 on
the apparent ground that
defendant knew or should have known of the bankrupt's [dealer's]
scheme to convert securities investment funds and nevertheless enabled the bankrupt to engage in large-scale speculations with its cus1 2
tomers' funds through defendant's office.
Accordingly, where there is a gross disregard for brokers' duties un-

der rule 405, the Buttrey court presumably would attribute constructive knowledge of a customer's fraudulent scheme to the broker
and thereby satisfy the scienterrequirement under rule 1Ob-5.

Thus, proof of a defendant's actual knowledge of, or reckless
disregard for, the fraudulent nature of a given securities transaction
will satisfy any interpretation of the scienter requirement in rule lOb5 private damage actions.

However, the critical question, for pur-

poses of protecting injured parties from customers' fraud in the national securities exchange markets, is whether misconduct which is

merely negligent will be actionable under rule IOb-5. Notwithstanding some language to the contrary and a lack of any Supreme
159. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418
F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210
(9th Cir. 1962). Despite the broad language of many of these cases on the scienter issue, the facts in each case showed the existence of actual knowledge of
the fraudulent scheme or misrepresentation on the part of the defendants. See
Bucklo 598-600.
160. See, e.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 925 (1972); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970); Bucklo 570-76; cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
161: Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 143
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). For a discussion of the factual situation in Buttrey, see note 68 supra.
162. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
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Court pronouncement on the subject,' 1 3 an analysis of all federal
circuit court holdings indicates that civil liability under rule 10b-5
has been imposed, whether by primary liability or an "aiding and
abetting" theory, 164 only in cases where defendants had knowledge
163. Neither Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971), nor Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 28 (1972), discussed the problem of scienter under rule lOb-5. In analyzing an analogous
anti-fraud provision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (declaring it unlawful
for any investment adviser to engage in any practice "which operates as a fraud or
deceit upon any client," 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1970) ) the Court in SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), held, inter alia, that it
was not necessary for the SEC in an injunction suit "to establish fraud and deceit
'in their technical sense,' including intent to injure . . . ." Id. at 186, 195, quoting
191 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). However, the courts have traditionally
held that specific intent to defraud is not a necessary element in a rule 10b-5 action either, see Bucklo 571-73. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Capital Gains
emphasized the fact that the SEC was seeking injunctive relief rather than money
damages ("It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to
establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages," 375 U.S. at
193). The courts, however, have traditionally construed the elements of rule
lOb-5 recovery liberally in cases seeking injunctive relief-as, for example, with
reference to the purchaser-seller Birnbaum standing requirement. See, e.g., Kahan
v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970);
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490
(N.D. Ohio 1967); Ruder, Current Developments, supra note 147, at 12991300; cf. Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969). But
see Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1967).
Consequently, the Capital Gains case offers no effective guidance for the disposition of the scienter issue in rule lOb-5 cases.
164. The broker who consummates customers' fraud can theoretically be held
civilly liable to the rightful owner of misappropriated property for having aided
and abetted the rule lOb-5 violations, if any, committed by the broker's fraudulent
customer. See note 183 infra and accompanying text. Were the courts to apply a
relaxed scienter requirement with reference to secondary liability under rule lOb-5
for aiding and abetting, claimants injured by a customers' fraud would have a
useful tool, indeed, for redressing a broker's violation of the "know your customer"
rule. Nevertheless, the scienter requirement (proof of defendant's actual knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, a fraudulent scheme) is adhered to strictly in
cases seeking to hold a defendant civilly liable for damages for aiding and abetting
a rule lOb-5 violation. See Ruder, supra note 24, at 630-38. Several recent cases
have even indicated that a defendant must be shown to have had actual knowledge of
the fraudulent scheme before recovery will be allowed. E.g., Sennott v. Rodman &
Renshaw, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,727 (7th Cir. 1973); SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Rodman, for example, the Seventh Circuit refused to hold a brokerage firm liable for an alleged
primary rule lOb-5 violation of a former employee, in the absence of convincing
proof that the firm's partners had actual knowledge of the fraudulent scheme.
In reversing a lower court judgment of damages, the Seventh Circuit stated:
As to . . . [plaintiff's] position that Rodman [the brokerage firm] was
guilty of "aiding and abetting" in the option scheme, our conclusion that
the evidence does not support the trial judge's finding that William Rothhart [firm's partner] had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme precludes
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imposition of liability on this basis. Without a showing that a Rodman
partner or agent had knowledge of fraudulent acts . . . there is no basis

for holding Rodman liable for acts of third parties. CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 93,727, at 93,219 (emphasis supplied).
In the Spectrum case, furthermore, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, while recognizing that an attorney "may have been guilty of some
negligence in preparing the opinion letter" (which stated that a certain transfer of
previously unregistered securities did not have to be registered under the Securities Act), the court refused to hold the attorney liable under rule lob-5 as an
aider and abettor, stating:
[Blefore one may be deemed an aider and abettor to any scheme, he
must have knowledge of the improper scheme and must perform or neglect to perform an act the performance or omission of which is necessary
to the furtherance of the scheme with the purpose of furthering the
scheme. CCH F. SEc. L. REP. 93,631, at 92,867-68.
See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
where, in holding an issuer liable under rule lOb-5 for aiding and abetting the
fraudulent practices of a dealer who was selling its securities, the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that
the foregoing recital of facts could reasonably permit the trial judge to
find that Midwestern [the issuer] officials knew Dobich [the dealer] was
misusing his customers' money, that is, that he was selling Midwestern
stock which he did not own and did not then have funds to purchase.
Id. at 151 (emphasis supplied).
Another line of recent cases indicates that reckless disregard of a fraudulent
scheme will be sufficient to attach liability to a defendant as an aider and abettor
of a rule 10b-5 violation. See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969);
Ruder, supra note 140, at 634-36. In Buttrey, for example, allegations that a broker
displayed a "callous disregard" for rule 405, by trading on behalf of a customer whom
it "should have known" was investing with misappropriated funds, were held sufficient to state a valid cause of action against the broker for damages for aiding and
abetting under rule lob-5. 410 F.2d at 143-44. In First Securities, the Seventh
Circuit stated that "liability predicated on aiding and abetting may be founded on
less than actual knowledge and participation in the activity proscribed in Section
10 and Rule lob-5." 463 F.2d at 987. The court then indicated that such liability could attach upon a brokerage firm which "willfully" or "recklessly"
failed to exercise proper supervisory controls over one of its officers:
Here, First Securities [brokerage firm] made Nay its president, provided
him with the trappings of a successful investment counsellor, held him
out as providing such counsel, and then wilfully allowed Nay's enforcement of a rule regarding the opening of mail [by no one else except
Nay] which was antithetical to the prevention of frauds of the type
which occurred. We hold that First Securities aided and abetted Nay's
fraud and is jointly liable therefor. 463 F.2d at 488 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, recent cases indicate that liability under rule 10b-5 for aiding and abetting can only be predicated on actual knowledge or recklessness and that mere
negligence will not be sufficient. Accord, Comment, Civil Liability for Violation of
NASD Rules: SEC v. First Sec. Co., 121 U. PA. L. REv. 388, 389 n.10
(1972). But see Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities
Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 969, 1017 n.228, indicating that the district court in the now-famous case,
SEC v. National Student Marketing, Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3,
1972), may have the opportunity to hold a group of attorneys and their firms liable as aiders and abettors under rule lob-5 for negligent failures to take affirmative action.
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of a fraudulent scheme or misrepresentation or showed conduct so
reckless that knowledge was imputed. 165 Consequently, the prevailing view of the courts still appears to be that "mere" or "ordinary" negligence on the part of the defendant, without more, will
not be sufficient to sustain civil liability under rule 1Ob-5. 160
165. See Bucklo 575-76; Ruder & Cross 1141-42; Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d Cir.), (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1972).
166. See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir.
1971); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,714 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 92,748 (N.D. I1. 1970); Weber v. C.M.P., 242
F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Bucklo 570-71, 590; Ruder & Cross 1140-42.
There has been considerable confusion exhibited by the courts and commentators on the existence and exact definition of the scienter requirement under rule
10b-5. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 158, 1070-72; Epstein, The Scienter
Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. REV. 482 (1970); Mann,
supra note 17; Meisenholder, supra note 142; Ruder & Cross 1141; Note, Scienter and
Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057 (1969); Comment, Scienter in Private Damage
Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57 GEo. L.J. 1108 (1969). The first mention of the
scienter requirement in private damage actions under rule 10b-5 appeared in
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), where the Second
Circuit declared that conduct becomes actionable under section 10(b) when it has
"the ingredient of fraud." Id. at 786-87. Since that case the Second Circuit has
been a continual proponent of the scienter requirement, even in its ostensibly most
liberal case on the scienter issue, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968), which involved an SEC
enforcement action. See Bucklo 576-81. The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed
its view of scienter in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d
Cir. 1971), by affirming the dismissal of a rule lob-5 cause of action on the
ground that
plaintiffs claim is nothing more than a garden-variety customers' suit
against a broker for breach of contract, which cannot be bootstrapped
into an alleged violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, or Rule 10b-5,
in the absence of allegation of facts amounting to scienter: intent to
defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device,
scheme or artifice to defraud. It is insufficient to allege mere negligence.
Id. at 445.
See also Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). The Fifth Circuit also explicitly recognizes the
scienter requirement. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970);
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S.
Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. %93,682, at 93,035 n.7 (D.Del. 1972).
The Ninth Circuit has assumed the most permissive position on scienter
since its language in Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), intimated that
scienter was not necessary in proving a defendant's liability under rule 10b-5. Id.
at 274. For similar broad language, see also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.,
430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210
(9th Cir. 1962). However, in all of the above three Ninth Circuit cases, the facts
showed that either actual knowledge or recklessness on the part of defendants was
actually present, and thus any attempted break away from the scienter requirement
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The lack of actionability under rule lOb-5 for merely negligent
misconduct is especially apposite in cases involving the attempted

redressal of customers' fraud under that rule. This is because a
broker's liability for disregard of "know your customer" duties will
be predicated not on any misrepresentation or omission of material

facts by an "insider," but on his employment of a "scheme to defraud or a course of business which "operates . . . as a fraud or
deceit," within the meaning of the first and third clauses of rule
lOb-5. 167 In the only customers fraud case to consider the neglican be regarded as dicta. See Bucklo 581-84. In fact, "[d]espite the Ninth Circuit's claimed relaxation of the scienter requirement, it does not yet appear that
liability has been found where a defendant's conduct was merely negligent."
Bucklo 584.
The other circuits, to the extent that they have considered the scienter
issue, have all recognized rule 10b-5 liability in their actual holdings only in cases
where scienter existed on the part of the defendants, despite language or dicta
indicating that scienter was not required. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.,
458 F.2d 255, 286 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 874 (1972); Bucklo 575, 590; Ruder & Cross 1141. See also Dasho
v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972); Parrent v. Midwest Rug
Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). After a lengthy study of all the circuit court cases
on the subject of scienter, one commentator concluded that all purported departure
from the scienter requirement could be attributed either to (1) dicta in the cases or
(2) broad statements-such as "proof of specific intent to deceive is not required" or "common law fraud need not be alleged or proved"-which do not circumvent the requirement of proving actual knowledge or recklessness and hence
do not actually mark departures from the scienter requirement after all. Bucklo
571, 575. The commentator finally concluded:
Examination of all the circuit court decisions discussing the scienter
problem reveals that liability has yet to be imposed in a private action
for damages where the defendant's conduct was merely negligent; damage awards to private plaintiffs have been confined to cases where either
knowing or reckless conduct was the cause of injury. Bucklo 563.
Accord, Ruder & Cross, supra note 142, at 1141. After examining most of the
scienter cases "to glean their collective wisdom," concurring and dissenting Judge
Adams in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) (the majority did not discuss the scienter issue) similarly
concluded:
The first factor which becomes apparent is that in every case where liability was found, conduct tantamount to actual fraud existed, despite the
fact that the reviewing court may have used language broader than necessary . .

.

. Thus, language must be peeled away to reach the core of

the rationale behind the actions of the courts. Id. at 286.
167. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEC. L. REP. 92,748 (N.D. III. 1970); note 170
infra and accompanying text. In the area of customers' fraud, a broker effectuates
a securities transaction on behalf of a customer who is trading with misappropriated
securities or funds, see notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text, and therefore
can be liable to the rightful owner only for employing a fraudulent scheme or
engaging in a fraudulent practice under clauses (a) and (c) of rule 10b-5, rather
than for a misrepresentation or omission under clause (b). There is specific men-
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gence issue squarely, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 168 the District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that a merely negligent
violation of rule 405 would not be actionable under rule 1Ob-5. 10 0
The Aetna court held that the broker's failure to make a rule 405

investigation, which in this case was tantamount to no more than
ordinary negligence, would not give rise to civil liability for damages
under rule lOb-5. The Aetna court noted that rule 10b-5 was not
a "negligence rule" and stated:
[Tihere is no such federal statutory liability [under rule 10b-5]
for mere negligence where a broker acts disinterestedly in its usual
capacity as a seller of securities in companies in which it has no protion of the words "fraud" or "deceit" in clauses (a) and (c) of rule lOb-5, whereas
clause (b) refers only to any "untrue statement" or omission of a material fact
needed to make a statement "not misleading." See note 138 supra. Furthermore,
most, if not all, of the cases which purportedly have eroded the scienter requirement appear to be clause (b) misrepresentation or omission cases. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961);
Bucklo 575-90. Accordingly, it seems arguable that violations of clauses (a) and
(c) are gauged by a stricter scienter standard than those under clause (b). Although this possible distinction between requirements of scienter under the different
clauses of rule lOb-5 does not appear to have been recognized yet by other commentators, see Epstein, supra note 166, at 492, it appears to have been a basis for
the decision in Aetna that rule 10b-5 liability in customers' fraud cases cannot be
predicated on the ordinary negligence of brokers. See note 170 infra.
The SEC regards the separate rule lob-5 clauses as "mutually supportive
rather than exclusive." Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 903, 913 (1961). On the
other hand, one author has even suggested that the broad language of clause (c)
"seems most useful" in protecting the private plaintiff from "negligent conduct."
This writer asserts that the language in clause (c)-"which operates or would
operate as a fraud upon any person"-concerns itself with the effects of behavior
rather than motivation and thus implies that scienter is not a necessary element
under this clause. Note, Elements of a Private Right of Action, supra note 142, at
561.
There is some suggestion, furthermore, inspired by Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970), that a negligence standard in scienter would
be appropriate, if at all, for professional persons such as brokers, where the nature
of their business relationship with investors imposes a duty to perform with care
as well as honesty. See Bucklo 595; Jacobs 876-81. The Aetna decision indicates,
however, that the broker owes no such special duty of care to the rightful owner
of misappropriated securities (or, presumably, funds), who is not the broker's immediate customer, and hence will not be liable to such rightful owners, pursuant to
this theory, for the negligent performance of "know your customer" duties in customers' fraud cases. See note 170 infra and accompanying text.
168. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 92,748 (N.D. Ill.

1970).
169. Id. For a discussion of the facts in Aetna, see notes 79-81 supra and
accompanying text.
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prietary interest and without violation of any duty to its immediate
170
customer.
Since the scienter requirement is still viable in a private rule

lOb-5 action against customers' fraud, including those founded on

71
a theory of secondary liability such as aiding and abetting,' civil
liability of brokers under rule lOb-5 for effectuating the fraudulent

schemes of their customers is limited. A broker's rule 405 violation
will be actionable under rule 10b-5 only where a broker has actual

knowledge of a customer's fraudulent transaction or constructive
knowledge arising from gross disregard of "know your customer"

investigatory duties.
170. Id. The Aetna court indicated that a broker ow'es no duty of care under
rule 10b-5 to the rightful owner of misappropriated securities, who is not his
immediate customer and to whom the broker does not stand in any fiduciary relationship. See Jacobs 875-76. The court based its holding in part on the premise that broker liability under clauses (a) and (c) of rule lOb-5, see note 138
supra, can be predicated only on a showing of scienter. See note 167 supra.
Recognizing that the liability of insiders and other fiduciaries for misrepresentations or omissions under clause (b) might possibly be based on a negligence
standard, the court stated:
Neither Section 17 [see note 137 supra] nor Rule 10b-5 is a negligence
rule and the allegations of the instant complaint simply do not establish
the fraudulent conduct which constitutes a violation of the federal securities laws ....
The critical point is that the instant complaint does not
describe a ". . . device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . ." [clause (a)]
or allege that the defendant-brokers engaged in fraud [clause (c)] ....
Plaintiff cites SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur . . . for the proposition that
Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 can encompass "negligence" as well as active
fraud. But Texas Gulf Sulphur and cases cited therein in support of
that proposition are concerned with the negligent conduct of a corporate
insider in the sale of securities. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
Sac. L. REP. 92,748, at 99,276 (emphasis added).
The Aetna court then concluded that the broker who trades in securities on behalf of customers in the ordinary course of business, unlike the corporate insider,
owes no special duty of care (to the original owner of misappropriated securities)
which might be actionable by a negligence standard under rule lOb-5. The
court stated:
Both the common law and the securities laws have long established a special duty of care for persons closely associated with an issuing corporation
or for professionals in the securities business, such as broker-dealer or investment counselors, when they are dealing in a quasi-fiduciary capacity
vis-h-vis their customers. Most commonly, the federal liability that is
established relates to representations made in an attempt to sell securities ....
It is not alleged that the defendant-brokers were involved in
the publication of misrepresentations of fact nor that they were insiders
or professionals with special obligations to the actual owners of the securities. According to the allegations, the actual owners were not the defendant-broker's customers nor even within the cognizance of the defendant-brokers. Consequently, no cause of action under . . Rule lOb-5
.. . has been established. Id.
One commentator discusses the broker's duty to the public in terms of foreseeability, positing that in a case like Aetna the broker is not liable under rule
lob-5 to the rightful owners of stolen securities and other "persons whose existence
cannot be foreseen." Jacobs 876.
171. See note 164 supra.
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Imputing Liability from Local Representatives to Brokerage Firms

The third potential barrier to relief for customer fraud under rule
10b-5 is the frequent need for imputing liability to brokerage firms

for violations of the rule committed by their local representatives.
This is not an insurmountable problem in civil suits under rule
lOb-5, however, due to the availability of two theories of recovery
12
against secondary defendants: section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 7
relating to the liability of a "controlling person," and the aiding and

abetting theory of secondary liability.
Statutory liability of broker as "controlling person." Under

section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, every person who "controls,"
directly or indirectly, any person who violates the Exchange Act or

its rules is made jointly or severally liable for the controlled person's
violation, subject only to the defense that the controlling person acted
in "good faith" and did not directly or indirectly induce the viola-

tion. 1 73 Under the liberal judicial interpretation of what constitutes
"control" within the meaning of section 20(a),174 a national brokerage firm will be liable for the rule 1Ob-5 violations of its local repre172. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). See note 173 infra. See Comment, supra note
33. The imputation of liability to the national firm itself is generally necessary in
cases of customers' fraud for two reasons. First, the damages that could be recovered from a single representative or employee may, as a practical matter, be insufficient to restore the injured party. Perhaps more important, the imputation of
liability may be the only way of placing on the national brokerage firm the burden
of insuring that local representatives, officers, and employees implement effective
measures for detecting customers' fraud. See notes 13-39 supra and accompanying
text.
173. (a) Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall 'also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled
person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation
or cause of action. Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
174. The Court does not believe that in using the word "control" the
Congress intended that degree of control or the right to direct necessary
to make out a common law relationship of principal-agent or employeremployee ....
The Congress believed, as is evidenced by this legislation, that the
rights of the public could be adequately protected in this field of our
economy only by extensive and rigid regulation and supervision, and when
one . . . directs another in such a manner as to defeat the purposes
of the legislation and violate the rights secured by the legislation, there
exists that degree of control necessary to create liability under [section
20(a)]. Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F.
Supp. 104, 123 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
See SEC v. First See. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968) ("The statute.., has been interpreted as requiring only some indirect
means of discipline, or influence short of actual direction to hold a 'controlling
person' liable").
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sentatives, unless the firm can establish its "good faith" defense.175

The natural result of this provision in the national exchange markets,
then, is to give centralized management of large brokerage houses
the incentive and duty to supervise the day-to-day conduct of the
firm's representatives for the purpose of detecting and eliminating
potential violations of the federal securities laws, including rule

1Ob-5.
Most of the litigation involving the potential liability of brokers

as controlling persons under section 20 has centered around the
question of what conduct on the part of brokers is sufficient to establish a "good faith" defense. Recent cases have construed the
term "good faith" narrowly and indicate that an objective, rather
than subjective, test is to be applied. 176 Thus, a broker who acts
175. "[It is clear that the relationship between a brokerage firm and its salesmen is one of controlling person to controlled person," Comment, supra note 33, at
97. For cases holding brokerage firms liable under section 20(a), see, e.g., SEC v.
First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), afI'd, 430 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1970); cf. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark.
1949). For cases where a brokerage firm has satisfied its "good faith" defense,
see, e.g., Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967),
petition for cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969); cf. Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,727 (7th Cir. 1973).
In many rule lob-5 broker supervision cases, courts have entertained a common law damage action for fraud in which claimants have employed theories of
common law agency in an attempt to attach secondary liability to brokerage firms.
See, e.g., Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, supra (supervisory broker held not liable
for fraud of ex-employee on theory of apparent agency); SEC v. First Sec. Co.,
supra (supervisory brokerage firm held liable for fraud of its president on theory
of apparent agency); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., supra (supervisory
broker held not liable under theory of "ostensible authority").
176. See, e.g., SEC v. First See. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,
438-39 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970); Lorenz v.
Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Comment, supra note 33, at 101.
But see Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, CCH Fmn. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,727, at 93,219
n.5 (7th Cir. 1973) ("without bad faith or inducement there can be no liability under
this section"); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Asehkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 697 (9th Cir.
1967), petition for cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969) ("the test of liability - . . for
the controlling person is that he must have acted in bad faith and directly or indirectly
induced the conduct constituting a violation or cause of action"); cf. Strong v. France,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 93,812 (9th Cir. 1973) (in a non-brokerage firm
case, alleged promoters of a newly formed corporation held not liable under
rule lOb-5 as "controlling persons" in absence of evidence that they acted in
bad faith and induced the illegal conduct).
See generally Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 601-08
(1972).
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with good intentions, honesty, and without bad faith or malevolent
7

intent, will not necessarily satisfy the "good faith" defense.1
Rather, if the broker is sufficiently careless in failing to "maintain
and diligently enforce a proper system of internal supervision and
control," an absence of good faith will be imputed to the brokerage
firm, regardless of the actual mental state of its controlling manage17 8
ment.

The application of these principles was demonstrated clearly in
a recent Seventh Circuit case, SEC v. First Securities Co. 107 In
First Securities, the president of an NASD-regulated brokerage

house, while acting within the apparent authority of his office, induced fifteen clients to invest in a non-existent "escrow" fund which

allegedly would yield a high interest rate of return on their investment.180 The brokerage firm had enforced a rule, established by
its president, requiring that all mail addressed to the firm at its office
and marked for his attention could be opened by no one except the

president. Consequently, all customer transactions with reference to
the fund were conducted by the president individually, without dis-

closure to the remaining members of First Securities, and were not
reflected in the firm's periodic accountings to its customers. After
the firm's president misappropriated the escrow fund, the injured

customers sued First Securities for damages under rule 10b-5.18'
177. See cases cited note 176 supra.
178. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). The district court in Hecht held that a
brokerage firm could not satisfy its "good faith" defense since it "did not maintain
a reasonably adequate system of internal supervision and control," and "did not
enforce with any reasonable diligence such system as it did maintain." 283 F.
Supp. at 439. Accord, SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert,
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) (quoting the objective test announced by the district
court in Hecht, see text accompanying note 182 infra); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.
Supp. 724, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ("to satisfy the requirement of good faith it is
necessary .. . to show that some precautionary measures were taken to prevent
the injury suffered"). It is worthy of note that the Ninth Circuit in Hecht cited
with approval the above portion of the lower court decision, see 430 F.2d at 1210,
and therefore appears to have questioned its former decision in Kamen, which
suggested use of a subjective, "bad faith" approach. But cf. Bucklo 583-84 (suggesting that the facts in Hecht showed recklessness on the part of the controlling
partners of the defendant brokerage firm).
179. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); see 121 U.
PA. L. REv. 388, 389 n.10 (1972). For further proceedings in this case involvinj
an injured creditor's claims against the First Securities Co. in an equitable receivership, see SEC v. First Sec. Co., 466 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1972).
180. 463 F.2d at 983-84.
181. Id. On June 4, 1968, the president of First Securities murdered his wife
and committed suicide, leaving "a suicide note which described First Securities as
being bankrupt because of his thefts and which described certain 'escrows' which

Vol. 1973:489]

NYSE RULE 405

The Seventh Circuit held that the brokerage firm's failure to use due
diligence in enforcing supervisory controls over its president would
preclude the firm's use of the "good faith" defense under section 20:
"The statute [section 20(a)] is remedial and is to be construed liberally. ... ." Indeed, it has been held that "to satisfy the requirement
of good faith [in order for a controlling person to avoid liability
thereby] it is necessary for the [controlling person] to show that
some precautionary measures have been taken to prevent the injury
suffered,". . and "that failure of the controlling person to maintain
and diligently enforce a proper system of internal supervision and
control constitutes participation in the misconduct and the violation
will be deemed to have been committed, not only by the controlled
person, but also by the controlling person who did not perform the
duty to prevent it."182
Liability of brokerage firm a. aider and abettor. Even without resort to section 20 of the Exchange Act, the imputation of rule
10b-5 liability to a broker can also be effected through use of an
aiding and abetting theory of secondary liability.18 3 Under this theory as normally applied, a defendant can be held liable for giving
active and knowing assistance to a violation of rule lOb-5 by a third
party.8 4 Recent cases in the area of broker supervision over representatives indicate, however, that it is not necessary to establish, on
were his creation as 'spurious."' Id. at 983. The district court determined that
the brokerage firm could not be held liable as a "controlling person" under section
20(a) for the rule lOb-5 violations of its president because there was "not sufficient evidence that First Securities acted in bad faith with respect to the escrow
funds." See id. at 987.
182. Id. at 987, quoting Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967);
Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 285 F. Supp. 417, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1968) affd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir.
1970). Thus, under the objective approach taken by the First Securities court and
other courts (see notes 176-78 supra), a broker's mere failure to use diligence in maintaining and enforcing a system of internal supervision and control over its representatives and employees will be sufficient to preclude its use of the "good faith" defense
under section 20(a). Accordingly, the case appears to augment the ease with which
an injured party can impute rule 10b-5 liability to a broker for the fraudulent practices
of the broker's representatives and employees.
183. For a comprehensive discussion of the availability of aiding and abetting
theories of secondary liability in rule 10b-5 cases, see generally Ruder, Multiple
Defendants, supra note 176, at 620-44.
184. An independent violation of rule 10b-5 must be established before a
third party may be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation. See Wessel
v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Pettit v.
American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Ruder, Multiple Defendants, supra note 176, at 628-30. "Once the independent wrong has been established, aiding and abetting liability will depend upon a showing that the defendant knew of the wrong and gave assistance to the wrongdoer" Id. at 630.
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the part of the supervisory broker, actual knowledge of, or actual
participation in, the fraudulent schemes of his subordinates.18
Rather, an aiding and abetting allegation can successfully be based
on, and the rule 10b-5 scienter requirement will be satisfied by,
facts which evidence a broker's willful or reckless inactivity in failing to exert adequate supervisory controls over its representatives.' 80
Thus, a brokerage firm, by knowingly or recklessly allowing inadequate measures to stay in effect, can be viewed as aiding and abetting the commission of fraudulent customer schemes which could
have been prevented if proper controls over subordinate persons had
been maintained.
Rule 10b-5 for Customer Fraud-AnIncomplete Remedy?
Injured plaintiffs unquestionably have made significant progress
in gaining judicial recognition of the private cause of action under
rule 1Ob-5 as a means of relief against the varying degrees of carelessness or fraud committed by brokers in effectuating the fraudulent
securities transactions of their customers. The purchaser/seller
standing requirement will be satisfied, for example, whenever the
natural result of a broker's failure to investigate a customer operates
as a fraud upon the rightful owners of the misappropriated funds or
securities.' 8 7 It is true, also, that the availability of section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act and the aiding and abetting theory facilitate the
imputation of secondary rule 1Ob-5 liability to a brokerage firm
which fails to maintain an effective system of internal supervision or
control over its representatives, even where the firm itself is guilty
of no active participation in, nor has any actual knowledge of, the
fraudulent transactions of its subordinates. 88
Although the secondary liability of a brokerage firm apparently
can be predicated on its failure to maintain and diligently enforce
supervisory controls which, if exercised, could have prevented a
fraudulent scheme involving a subordinate representative, it is nevertheless true that rule 1Ob-5 will be available only if the conduct of
the primary actor-the subordinate representative-is sufficiently
fraudulent to satisfy all the elements of a basic rule 1Ob-5 violation,
185. See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 880 (1972).
186. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants, supra note 176, at 641-44. Scienter
is an element in rule lOb-5 suits based on aiding and abetting and requires proof
that defendant had actual knowledge of, or displayed reckless disregard for, the
fraudulent scheme of the primary violator. Id. at 634-36; see note 164 supra.
187. See notes 152-55 supra and accompanying text.

188. See notes 155-78, 182, 185 supra and accompanying text.
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including scienter.'8 9 Thus, as long as the requirement for proof of
actual knowledge or recklessness remains the prevailing view of the

courts, especially in customers' fraud cases, civil liability in suits under rule 10b-5 cannot be based on the ordinary negligence of local
representatives in failing to detect and prevent customers' fraud.
To the extent, therefore, that the adequate protection of the investing
public from customer fraud relies on the enforcement of the "due

diligence" customer investigation standards envisioned by the "know
your customer" rule, 190 civil liability under rule 10b-5 does not afford effective relief to injured parties.
FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES

FOR VIOLATIONS OF RULE

405

In recent years, there has been a judicial movement toward the
expansion of the availability of private relief under the provisions
and rules of the federal securities laws designed for the protection of
investors. 91 Inspired by Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 92 and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 93
189. See notes 173-75, 184 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
191. See BROMBERG §§ 2.1-.6; 3 Loss 1682-1876. See generally Note, Implying
Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAv.L. REv. 285 (1963).
See notes 136-37, 139-41 supra and accompanying text.
192. 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946), modified, 73 F. Supp. 798, modified, 83 F.
Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held, for the first time, that a violation of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 of the Exchange Act would support a private cause of action for civil relief
for injured investors. The Court based this result on the rationale that "the disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort." Quoting the
RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, the Kardon court reasoned:

It is also true that there is no provision in Sec. 10 or elsewhere expressly
allowing civil suits by persons injured as a result of violation of See. 10
or of the Rule [10b-51. However, "The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a required act, makes
the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an
interest of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect. 69 F. Supp. at 513.
Since rule 10b-5 was promulgated specifically "for the protection of investors"
from fraudulent or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security, see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), it is not surprising that the Kardon
court, in applying its theory of civil relief for tortious invasion of statutorily protected rights, recognized the availability of a private cause of action for investors
injured by violations of that rule.
193. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The standards for implying a cause of action generally under the federal securities laws were postulated by the Supreme Court in
J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In recognizing an implied cause of
action under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970) and
the proxy rules issued thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 et seq., the Court empha-

546
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the development of the implied civil cause of action for violations of

these provisions has been founded on varying theories, the foremost
of which is aptly stated by the Second Circuit in Colonial Realty Co.
v. Bache & Co.:'0 4 "Implication of a private right of action may be
suggested by explicit statutory condemnation of certain conduct and a
general grant of jurisdiction to enforce liabilities created by the
statute . . ,"195 Based on the "general grant of jurisdiction" appearing in section 27 of the Exchange Act'1 6 and section 22 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),'~" the courts have recognized

implied liability under such notable investor protection provisions as
section 14(a)

9s

of the Exchange Act, rule lOb-5,10 0 and section 17

200
(a) of the Securities Act.
In contrast to the relative ease with which the courts have recognized implied private civil relief under the express provisions of the
federal securities laws and SEC rules, the courts have shown reluc-

tance to sanction implied federal liability against brokers for the vio-

lations of rules of self-regulatory agencies. 20 1 Although the Seventh
sized first, that the proxy provisions of the Exchange Act were intended specifically "for the protection of investors":
While this language [section 14(a)] makes no specific reference to a
private right of action, among its chief purposes is "the protection of investors," which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where
necessary to achieve that result. 377 U.S. at 432.
Viewing the threat of civil damages or injunctive relief as "a most effective
weapon" in the enforcement of the proxy requirements, the Borak Court also
based its holding on the rationale that private enforcement of the proxy rules
provided a "necessary supplement to Commission action." 377 U.S. at 432.
The Borak decision, therefore, appears to sanction an implied private cause of
action based on Exchange Act provisions designed for the protection of the investing public, at least when such civil remedy is a "necessary supplement" to
the SEC's express enforcement powers under the Act.
194. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). See Hoblin;
Lowenfels, hnplied Liabilities 21-23; Lowenfels, Private Enforcement, supra
note 23; MacLean, Brokers' Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD
Rules, 47 DENVER L.J. 63 (1970); Shipman; Rediker, supra note 23; Wolfson & Russo; Note, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violation of Exchange Rules,
83 HA{v. L. Rav. 825 (1970).
195. 358 F.2d at 181.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
197. Id.§ 77v (1970).
198. Id.§ 78n(a) (1970).
199. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
See notes 136-90 supra and accompanying text.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
201. See Colonial Realty Co. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); McMaster Hutchinson Co. v. Rothschild & Co.,
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. f 93,541 (N.D. Il1. 1972); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
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Circuit in its landmark case, Buttrey,2 2 held that an implied private

cause of action for damages for rule 405 violations does exist under

the Exchange Act,20° recent lower court decisions have disputed the
scope, nature and, indeed, existence of implied liability under rule
405.204 In fact, the statutory validity of implied civil relief under
exchange rules in general has been seriously questioned 20 5 and there

is a pressing need for a clear judicial resolution of this issue.
Statutory Basis for Civil Liability Under Rule 405
The power of the federal courts, if any, to adjudicate a private
cause of action for damages alleging a rule 405 violation is gener-

ally conceived to emanate from three provisions of the Exchange
f 93,748 (N.D. Ill. 1970). But see Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); cf. Bush
v. Bruns, Nordeman & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Several courts have acknowledged a private right of action and liability under
NASD rules. In SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 880 (1972), the Seventh Circuit, relying on Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra, asserted in a brief statement that violations of section 27 (art. III, § 27 of NASD Rules of Fair Practice, reprinted in CCH
NASD MANUAL 1 2177 (1967)), and other Rules of Fair Practice of the
NASD where the rule violated serves to protect the public, would support a
private cause of action for damages. However, this statement appears to be only
dicta since there were other primary grounds for the decision. See Avem Trust
v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969) (Seventh Circuit briefly recognized that NASD rules were actionable); Comment, Civil Liability, supra note 164.
See also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968),
a!f'd, 430 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1970) (both the circuit and district courts declined
to hold the broker civilly liable for violating the NASD "suitability rule"--art.
II, § 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, reprinted in NASD MANUAL, D-5
(1957)); Mercury Invest. Co. v. AG. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (1969);
Fishman, supra note 23; Lowenfels, Private Enforcement, supra note 23; Mundheim,
supra note 23; Rediker, supra note 23.
202. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). See Allen,
Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules,
25 Bus. LAw. 1493 (1970); Hoblin 263-68; Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities; MacLean,
supra note 194; Wolfson & Russo; Comment, Civil Remedies and Stock Exchange
Rules-An Emerging Concept of Implied Liability, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 551; Note,
supra note 194; Note, Stock Exchange Rules-Implied Civil Liability Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for Breach of "Know Your Customer" Rule, 3
IND. L.F. 555 (1970); Note, Securities-Civil Liability for Violation of Exchange
Rules, 24 S.W. LJ.384 (1970).
203. 410 F.2d at 141-43.
204. See McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. Y 93,541 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,748 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
205. See McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L.REp.
93,541 (N.D. Ill.
1972); cf. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d
178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). See also Note, supra note 194.
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Act. First, section 6(b) requires stock exchanges to issue rules ensuring that broker conduct is consistent with "just and equitable
principles of trade. 20 6 Second, interrelationship of these stock exchange rules with the federal regulatory scheme is enhanced by the
section 19(b) grant of authority to the SEC to change or supplant
exchange rules when deemed necessary for the protection of investors.2 0 7 Finally, section 27 of the Exchange Act confers exclusive

jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce Exchange Act provisions
and the "rules and regulations thereunder," as well as "any liability

or duty" that is "created by" the Exchange Act.2"'
Since there is a specific inclusion in section 29 of the Exchange
Act 20 9 of both "any rule or regulation" and "any rule of an exchange," most courts have concluded that Congress did not intend
the phrase "rules and regulations" in section 27 to include rules of
self-regulatory bodies.2 10 Necessarily, then, the statutory basis, if
any, for implying a federal cause of action under stock exchange
rules must rest on the authority of federal courts under section 27 to
enforce a "duty created by" the Exchange Act.211 If compliance
with rule 405, issued by the New York Stock Exchange pursuant to
the registration requirements in section 6(b), could be viewed as a
"duty created by" the Exchange Act, the implication of a federal
cause of action for damages presumably would have statutory validity. Although several recent lower court decisions have questioned
206. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970).
See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities 16-19;
Shipman 964-80. For the full text of this section, see note 44 supra.
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). See Allen, supra note 202, at 1496. For a further discussion of this section, see notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). This section provides that the federal district
courts "shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder." Id.
209. Id. § 78cc.
210. See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Colonial Realty Co. v. Bache &
Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. %93,541 (N.D. 111. 1972).
211. See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d
135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache
& Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); cf. Kroese v.
New York Stock Exch., 227 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (federal jurisdiction
was upheld under sections 6 and 27 for a stock exchange rule violation). The interpretation of the language "duty created by" in section 27 as supporting a federal right
of action for violations of exchange rules has been considered "a stretch of the
language" by some commentators. See, e.g., Note, supra note 194, at 834. See also
Wolfson & Russo 1128.
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the validity of such an interpretation,2 12 this was the statutory basis
perceived by the Seventh Circuit in Buttrey:
There is nothing inconsistent with this section [27] in holding that violations of Rule 405 may be actionable as a "duty created by this
chapter" inasmuch as Rule 405 was promulgated in accordance with
Sections 6 and 19 of the Act, even if Rule 405 is not in itself to be
21 3
considered a rule "thereunder.1
GeneralParametersof Implied Liability Under Rule 405
There has been extensive debate among commentators and
courts concerning the proper theories and parameters for implying
a private, federal cause of action under the rules of self-regulatory
bodies.11 4 Since the early Second Circuit decision in Baird v.
212. In McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., CCH FED. SEC.
L REP. 1 93,541 (N.D. Ill. 1972), a federal district court in the Seventh
Circuit inferred that federal jurisdiction for an implied cause of action under
rule 405 did not exist under section 27 (15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970)). Despite
the Buttrey court's use of the "liabilities and duties created by" language to
support the implication of a private cause of action, which in the McMaster
court's view was only dicta, the district court in McMaster concluded that recognition of jurisdiction under section 27 could only be achieved by interpreting the
word "rules" in section 27 to mean Exchange Rules. However, this interpretation,
according to the McMaster court, would be incorrect in light of the explicit reference to exchange rules in neighboring section 29. CCH FEn. SEC. L. REP. 93,541,
at 92,585 n.1. Cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [19691970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. I 93,748 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
One court, in DeRenzis v. Levy, 297 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), even
raised the question of whether "the procedures which give birth to the exchange
rules"--their promulgation by exchange directors with minimal notice and lack of
opportunity for comment-would render the implication of liability under exchange rules unconstitutional as violative of due process. Id. at 1001-02 & n.5.
See Wolfson & Russo 1133-35.
213. 410 F.2d at 142. In reaching this result, the Seventh Circuit relied on
Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities 18-19. The Second Circuit in Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), decided before Buttrey, also reasoned that a private cause of action for violation of
stock exchange rules could, under some circumstances, be predicated on section
6(b) and the language in section 27 regarding the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
for suits "brought to enforce any liability or duty." However, the Colonial court
concluded that the particular stock exchange rule involved in that case was not a
substitute for SEC regulation sufficient to support a damage claim under federal
law. 358 F.2d at 181-83.
214. See Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities; Wolfson & Russo. There are essentially two major theories as to when stock exchange rules should be considered
actionable. First, if an exchange rule is designed for the protection of investors, it
should support an implied cause of action under federal law. See Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities 22-23. Lowenfels was inspired by the language and reasoning
of the Second Circuit in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944). The Baird case had sustained a private cause of action
against the New York Stock Exchange to require it to enforce its own rules issued
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Franklin,21 the courts have recognized the existence of a private
cause of action against a stock exchange for failure to observe its

statutory duty to enforce disciplinary rules issued pursuant to section
6(b) of the Exchange Act.21 The parameters for implying a private cause of action against brokers for stock exchange rule violations, however, were not delineated until the Second Circuit deciunder section 6(b) of the Exchange Act. See note 44 supra. The Baird court
reasoned that the implication of such a federal cause of action was necessary to
fulfill the Exchange Act's policy of insuring that "the investing public . . . be
completely and effectively protected." Id. at 244-45. See Hoblin 275-77; Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities 20. See also Wolfson & Russo 1129-33.
The second major theory of implied liability under stock exchange rules, developed in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), is that violations of exchange rules should only be
actionable when they essentially serve as substitutes for direct SEC rules. See Hoblin
274-78. The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in the Buttrey case to imply
a cause of action under rule 405 seems to incorporate aspects of both theories.
See notes 227-32 infra and accompanying text. It should be noted that both theories were apparently rejected by the court in McMaster Hutchinson as a basis for
civil liability under rule 405. See CCH FFD. SEc. L. REP. 93,541, at 92,584-85.
Furthermore, in considering these theories, it should be recalled that there is evidence that the original primary purpose of rule 405 was the protection of the capital
of NYSE firms from financially irresponsible customers. See note 63 supra.
215. 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
216. Baird v. Franklin, id., established that parties injured by stock exchange
member actions in violation of the exchange's rules have a private right of action
against the New York Stock Exchange for failing to enforce these rules against its
members under section 6(b) of the Exchange Act. See note 44 supra. Accord,
Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See Shipman
971-72. However, the plaintiffs in Baird did not prevail because the court determined that the stock exchange's delinquency was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. 141 F.2d at 239.
Later cases have refined this type of implied cause of action recognized originally in Baird. In Butterman v. Walston & Co., 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967),
the Seventh Circuit held that the New York Stock Exchange did not have the duty
to enforce its rules if it was not legally charged with having knowledge of the improper conduct of a member. Liability of the New York Stock Exchange (and
presumably other registered exchanges) for failing to enforce exchange rules was
upheld again in the recent case, Weinberger v. New York Stock Exch., 335
F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In this case, the court recognized plaintiff's theory
that he was a third party beneficiary of the contract between the stock exchange
and the Securities Exchange Commission. Noting that a New York case, Fata v.
S.A. Healy Co., 289 N.Y. 401, 46 N.E.2d 339 (1943), held that a contract drafter
pursuant to a statutory command may afford a remedy to an individual in the
benefited class, the Weinberger court concluded that both state and federal common law observed the RESTATEMENT oF CoNmTRcTs rule governing third party
beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACrs § 145 (1934). The Weinberger court
then concluded that the policy of the Exchange Act, as interpreted by the Second
Circuit in Baird, was to make the investor more than an incidental beneficiary of the
contract mandated by Congress and hence to give him an independent claim for relief.
335 F. Supp. at 144.
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sion in ColonialRealty Co. v. Bache & Co. 217
In the Colonial Realty case, a New York Stock Exchange
broker allegedly sold securities improperly out of a customer's margin account by requiring a margin balance in excess of the minimum
requirements of the New York Stock Exchange.21 8 The injured
NYSE customer sought unsuccessfully to base an action for damages
on a provision of the New York Stock Exchange constitution which
required its member brokers to maintain conduct consistent with

"just and equitable principles of trade.

21 9

Noting that Congress

did not intend that violatons of all rules adopted under section 6 (b)
of the Exchange Act would be actionable in a federal court, the

Second Circuit postulated that some stock exchange rules, however,
would amount to a "substitute for regulation by the SEC itself" and
would support a federal cause of action.220 Such a situation could

exist, the court suggested, if the SEC refrained from issuing a superseding rule under section 19221 in order to permit the exchanges to

adopt or maintain rules of their own. Concerning this possibility, the
court said:
. . .Congress authorized the agency to request modification of particular rules or to promulgate superseding regulations on its own, §
19. A particular stock exchange rule could thus play an integral part
in SEC regulation notwithstanding the Commission's decision to take
a back-seat role in its promulgation and enforcement, and we would
not wish to say that such a rule could not provide the basis for im222
plying a private right of action.
217. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), affg [19611964 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See
generally Hoblin 43; Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities; Wolfson & Russo.
218. 358 F.2d at 179.
219. N.Y. Stock Exch. Const., art. XIV, reprinted in CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH.
GuIDE 1 1656 (1972). The plaintiffs were also asserting implied liability under
article I, § 2(a) of the NASD by-law (reprinted in CCH NASD DEALERS MANUAL (1967))
and article IlI, § 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice (reprinted
The Second Circuit affirmed a
in CCH NASD DEALERS MANUAL (1967)).
district court's dismissal of the complaint and held that there was no private cause
of action to redress violations of such general provisions of the stock exchange
rules. 358 F.2dat 182-83.
220. That Congress did not intend violations of all rules adopted under
§ 6(b) to give rise to civil claims under federal law is somewhat indicated by the explicit reliance in the section [see note 44 supra] on the
disciplinary function of the exchanges to provide protection for the investing public ....
On the other hand, we cannot ignore that the concept of supervised self-regulation is broad enough to encompass a rule which- provides
what amounts to a substitute for regulation by the SEC itself. 358 F.2d
at 81-82.
221. Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). See note 46 supra.
222. 358 F.2d at 182. In determining whether a given stock exchange rule is
such an "integral part of SEC regulation" capable of sustaining a private right of
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The broad exchange rule requiring conduct to be consistent with
"just and equitable principles of trade" was not, according to the

Colonial Realty court, a substitute for SEC regulation and therefore
was held not to support an implied cause of action under the Exchange Act.22 3 To hold otherwise, the Second Circuit reasoned,
would "saddle the federal courts with garden-variety customer-bro224
ker suits"-a result that was clearly unintended by Congress.
The parameters introduced in Colonial Realty for implying a

federal cause of action under stock exchange rules were refined further by the Seventh Circuit in Buttrey2 k-the first case to hold that

rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange would, in some cases,
support a private cause of action for damages under the Exchange
Act. In Buttrey, the Seventh Circuit determined that a trustee in
bankruptcy, suing on behalf of its injured creditors, would have a
valid cause of action for damages against a broker who displayed an

allegedly "callous disregard" of rule 405 by effectuating securities
transactions on behalf of the bankrupt's president, whom the broker
had reason to know was investing with misappropriated funds. 22 0 In
resolving whether a violation of a given stock exchange rule would

support a private cause of action under the federal securities laws, the
Buttrey court appears to have envisioned a two-step inquiry. Unlike

the ColonialRealty court, the Seventh Circuit in Buttrey looked, first,
at the purpose behind the stock exchange rule. 2

If the rule was de-

action, the Second Circuit stated further:
[Tihe court must look to the nature of the particular rule and its place
in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than
when the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for
implication would be strongest where the rule imposes an explicit duty
unknown to the common law. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 183. The court was greatly concerned that by interpreting section
27 of the Exchange Act to include self-regulatory agency rule violations within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, the state courts would be effectively
stripped of any power to adjudicate such claims. This result, according to the
court, was inconsistent with the congressional intent manifested in federal securities
legislation. See Hoblin 261-63.
The Second Circuit expressed these jurisdictional concerns vividly:
[M]ere recitation of the statutory watchword ["conduct inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade"] by an aggrieved party would saddle
the federal courts with garden-variety customer-broker suits, even though
the controversy was between citizens of the same state, the sum in
question did not attain the jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 [diversity jurisdiction], and there was no indication that the case
would be decided differently under state law-unless we were to make
the large assumption that by requiring adoption of rules embodying the
phrase Congress meant to develop a new body of broker-customer law.
358 F.2d at 183.
225. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
226. Id. at 143. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
227. 410 F.2d at 142.
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signed for the "direct protection of investors," then it would be the
type of rule from which private civil relief could be implied and such
a rule would presumptively be actionable.2 2 The court summarized:
The touchstone for determining whether or not the violation of a particular rule is actionable should properly depend upon its design "for
the direct protection of investors" . . . . Here one of the functions of Rule 405 is to protect the public, so that permitting a private action for its violation is entirely consistent with the purpose of
229
the statute.
Apparently recognizing that many exchange rules, including rule
405, impose "housekeeping" duties not worthy of federal enforcement, however, the Seventh Circuit declined to decide that rule 405
was per se actionable. 23 ° Rather, the court indicated that the determination of the actionability of a stock exchange rule should
depend,
in turn, on the resolution of a second problem of defining what kinds
of violations of the particular rule could properly be cognizable in a
federal court. To resolve this issue, the Buttrey court fell back on
the standard outlined in Colonial Realty, indicating that a breach of
an exchange rule would be actionable whenever a private remedy
for such breach plays "an integral part in the SEC regulation. 23 1
Under the apparent rationale in Buttrey, therefore, a violation of a
stock exchange rule designed for the protection of investors will be
actionable whenever the enforcement of the particular remedy comprises a substitute for, and thus an integral part of, SEC regulation. 232
In applying its standard to the facts in Buttrey, the Seventh Circuit noted that Merrill Lynch had accepted investments "without
regard for [its customer's] defalcations of investors' funds. 2 33 Such
228. Id. The court relied on Professor Lowenfel's reading of Baird v. Franklin,
141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
See Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities 19-20. See also Hoblin 263-68; Wolfson & Russo 1129-30.
229. 410 F.2d at 142.
230. Id.
231. Id. The portion of the court's opinion revealing this second step of its
analysis is as follows:
We do not. decide that an alleged violation of Rule 405 is per se actionable. However, Count I pertains to the defendant's acceptance of investments without regard for the bankrupt broker's defalcations of investors' funds. Such a breach of fair practice undermines the protection
of investors and surely "play[s] an integral part in SEC regulation" of
Exchanges and their members. Id., citing Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966).
232. 410 F.2d at 142.
233. Id. For a discussion of the facts in Buttrey, indicating the recklessness of the defendant broker's misconduct, see notes 68, 161-62 supra and
accompanying text.
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a violation of rule 405, according to the court, was "tantamount to

fraud" and actionable in a federal court:
Although mere errors of judgment by defendant might not support a
federal cause of action, the facts alleged here are tantamount to
fraud on the bankrupt's customers, thus giving rise to a private civil
234
damage action.

Having determined initially that rule 405 was designed for the
protection of investors and, therefore, presumptively actionable, the
Seventh Circuit in Buttrey indicated that this fact would be sufficient
to allow a rule 405 civil cause of action to override a motion to disiss.235 As stated by the Buttrey court, the second inquiry envisioned in the court's two-step standard-whether private enforcement of a particular violation is an integral part of SEC regulation
and therefore within the cognizance of a federal court-is best conducted at the trial on the merits: "Until this case is actually tried, it
will be impossible to ascertain whether defendant has violated Rule
405, and if so, whether the violations justify the imposition of lia23
bility." 6
Post-Buttrey Cases on Rule 405

A number of lower court decisions following in the wake of
Butirey have attempted to limit the availability of implied civil relief

for violations of rule 405,237 emphasizing the Seventh Circuit's refusal in Buttrey to decide that an alleged violation of rule 405 is

"per se actionable.

' 238

However, contrary to the suggestions in

234. Id. at 143. One commentator indicates that the Buttrey court was essentially, with this analysis, attempting to establish a standard of care for brokers'
investigation of customers which would aid in determining when violations of rule
405 will be actionable. See Wolfson & Russo 1129-31. But see Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. %93,748, at 99,273-74 (N.D. I11. 1970), stating that a broker owes
no special duty of care to the rightful owner of misappropriated securities which
are negotiated through the broker; see note 151 supra and accompanying text.
Another commentator has criticized the Buttrey decision for its reliance on fraud as
a grounds for determining whether rule 405 is actionable:
What is the relationship between a fraud concept and that of a rule
violation? No one disputes that a charge of fraud is actionable at common law or under rule 10b-5; that was not the question before the court.
With respect to that court, fraud was irrelevant; either the violation of the
rule was actionable or it was not. The question of fraud should not
have entered into the court's consideration. Hoblin 267.
235. 410 F.2d at 143.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. f 93,541 (N.D. 111. 1972); Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,748 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
238. See notes 230-31 supra and accompanying text.
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Buttrey that the full extent of the rule's actionability should be de-

termined in any given situation at trial, several lower court cases
have granted motions to dismiss rule 405 suits for failure to state a
federal cause of action." 9 The combined effect of these decisions
is to limit Buttrey to its most narrow facts-rule 405 is actionable
only to redress misconduct which is alleged to be "tantamount to
fraud."2 40
In the first rule 405 case to follow Buttrey-Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.241-the mere negligent failure to make a "due diligence"

242
investigation was held not to be actionable in a federal court.
Relying on language in Buttrey that "mere errors of judgment . . .

might not support a federal cause of action,' '2

4

the court appears

to have resolved any matter of doubt by indicating that mere negligent errors would not be actionable. 2 " As a justification for its
holding, the Aetna court showed great concern that a complete feder-

alization of a broker's rule 405 "due diligence" duties would create
an "undesirable and unjustifiable" burden on the federal courts 24to

adjudicate, exclusively, "the widest range of broker's misfeasance."

5

Subsequent to the holding in Aetna that "mere negligence"

would not be actionable under rule 405, the recent decision in McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co.24 6 appears to limit the

Buttrey holding further by indicating that no violation of the "know
your customer" rule will support a private cause of action in "the
absence of actual fraud."

In the McMaster case, an employee of a

239. See McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,541 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis; [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,748 (N.D.Ill.
1970).
240. See note 234 supra and accompanying text.
241. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fm.SEc. L. REP.
93,748 (N.D. Ill.
1970).
242. Id. at 99,274. See Wolfson & Russo 1131. For a statement of the facts
in Aetna, see notes 180-81 supra and accompanying text.
243. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135,
143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) (emphasis added). See note 234
supra and accompanying text.
244. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,748, at 99,274.
245. Id. at 99,275. See Wolfson & Russo 1131. The Aetna court displayed the
same concerns over the jurisdictional problems of federalizing "garden-variety
customer-broker suits" as were recognized in the Colonial Realty decision. See
note 224 supra and accompanying text. The Aetna court's refusal to grant a private cause of action was based, in addition, on its concern for insuring that rule
405 and the remedies for violation thereof would not be construed so broadly as to
frustrate the principles of free transfer of negotiable instruments. See notes 79-81
supra and accompanying text.
246. CCH FED. SEc. L RP.
93,541 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See Brodsky, supra note
1, pt. I, at 4, col. 3.
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securities dealer, McMaster Hutchinson & Co., had misappropriated
company funds and used them to conduct securities transactions
through an NYSE broker. McMaster Hutchinson later brought an
action against the broker to recover the commissions paid by the
employee, alleging violations of rules 405, 406247 and 407248 of the
New York Stock Exchange. The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, however, granted a motion to dismiss the complaint, recognizing that violation of rule 405 was not actionable per
se. 24 9 The court then held, in effect, that there could be no implied

cause of action under rule 405 in the absence of allegations in the
complaint that a broker had committed "actual fraud." 20 In addition to limiting Buttrey to its most narrow holding, the McMaster
decision reflected grave doubts as to whether there actually is a
proper statutory basis authorizing a federal cause of action for violations of exchange rules.251
In contrast to the uncertainty created by the McMaster decision
247. 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK Excn. GumE 12406 (1972).
248. Id.112407.
249. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,541, at 92,585.
250. Id. After discussing the potential statutory basis for an implied cause
of action under rule 405, the McMaster court concluded:
No case has been cited for the proposition that a violation of stock exchange rules per se sets forth a federally protected private right of action.

In Buttrey . . . actual fraud was alleged; the court specifically

stated it was not finding stock exchange rules actionable per se . ...
Btttrey was distinguished by the Aetna decision on the same ground that
this Court is distinguishing it-the absence of actual fraud. Id. at
92,585.
In a footnote, the McMaster court emphasized further its narrow reading of
Buttrey. Referring to much of the broad language in Buttrey, see text accompanying note 209 supra, as "dicta," the McMaster court noted that the complaint in
Buttrey had alleged "actual fraud" and that "there are no allegations of fraud in the
instant suit." Id. 1 93,541, at 92,585 n.l.
251. Id. at 92,584-86. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that implied liability under
rule 405 should be recognized because of the similarities between rule 405 and the
analogous SEC rule 15b10-4 (see note 65 supra):
Plaintiff asserts that because both Rule 15blO-4 and rule 405 have the
same underlying philosophy, protection of the investing public and the
securities markets, and further, because both rules have the same ultimate source of authority, the '34 Act, it would be manifestly unjust to
draw the distinction that one of the rules (15b10-4) presents the basis for
a federally cognizable issue while the other (rule 405) does not simply
because the former was promulgated by the SEC while the latter was
promulgated by an individual exchange acting under the specific delegated authority of the SEC. Id. at 92,584.
The McMaster court, however, concluded that "the distinction must be drawn"
because of the express statutory distinctions drawn in sections 27 and 29 with regard to stock exchange rules and SEC rules under the Exchange Act. Id. at
92,584-85.
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over the scope and even the statutory validity of implied civil relief
under rule 405, a more recent case in the Southern District of New
York, Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co.,2 52 appears to have re-established the position of rule 405 in the arsenal of federal remedies for
customer fraud. In the Bush decision, the federal cause of action
under rule 405 has, for the first time since Buttrey, survived a motion to dismiss. The fact situation in Bush is almost identical to
that of Buttrey. An employee of a securities dealer opened an account with an NYSE broker and traded in securities with funds converted from his employer. 53 When the securities dealer went bankrupt, the trustee in bankruptcy brought an action for damages against
the broker, alleging violation of the "know your customer" rule as
the proximate cause of losses incurred by the bankrupt. The district
court overruled the defendant's motion to dismiss on the broad
grounds that "a violation of rule 405 creates a right enforceable by
a private action for damages in some cases. 254
Following the approach sanctioned in Buttrey, the Bush court
indicated that the resolution of the question whether a violation is
actionable in any given case is a matter to be determined at trial,
rather than on a motion to dismiss:
It is too early in the proceedings of the instant case to detrmine if
the defendant has violated Rule 405 and if so, whether the violation
gives rise to a private cause of action. . . . Since an alleged violation of Rule 405 may be actionable, it can withstand a motion to dis255
miss made in the preliminary stages of a case.
Since the Bush court expressly refused, at this preliminary stage of
the case, to reach the issue of whether a violation of rule 405 is per
se actionable, it appears that the judiciary will again be faced with
an opportunity to examine the scope of the private cause of action
under that rule.
Futureof the "Federal"Rule 405-A Need for Re-examination
25 6
Until the recent decision in Bush v. Bruns Nordeman & Co.,
252. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See Brodsky, supra
note 1, pt. I.
253. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,674, at 93,007. The plaintiff in Bush alleged:
[Djefendant, a licensed broker-dealer in securities and a member of the
New York and American Stock Exchanges, permitted one Anthony Masiello,
an employee of the bankrupt [a securities dealer], to open an account
without conducting any investigation of Masiello's financial responsibility
as required by rule 405 .... Id.
254. Id. at 93,008.
255. Id. Accord, Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
256. CCII FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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the lower court decisions after Buttrey had attempted to confine the
availability of the rule 405 federal cause of action recognized in
Buttrey. The Seventh Circuit in Buttrey, on the one hand, had indicated in broad language that since a primary function of rule 405
was the protection of the investing public, the implication of a private cause of action would be proper whenever the enforcement of
any violation of that rule is an integral part of SEC regulation.157 However, the subsequent Aetna and McMaster cases, both
decided within the Seventh Circuit, have indicated that rule 405 definitely is not per se actionable, have questioned the statutory validity
of an implied rule 405 cause of action in the federal regulatory
scheme, and have attempted to limit Buttrey to situations where
the broker's alleged misconduct is "tantamount to fraud. 25 a
Although the Bush case has reaffirmed the viability of implied
civil relief under rule 405 as a federal cause of action capable of
withstanding a motion to dismiss, the Bush court has not yet delineated further the scope of that remedy. 20 Accordingly, the Buttrey holding, as interpreted narrowly by its progeny of lower court
decisions, is still controlling. Thus, the private cause of action for
damages under rule 405 exists, as a certainty, only for rule 405 violations which are "tantamount to fraud" 2 60-that is, presumably,
where a broker performs his "know your customer" duties either
with recklessness or with actual knowledge of a customer's fraud.
To the extent that the prevention of customer fraud in the securities
markets depends on the enforcement of "due diligence" standards
of the type envisioned by the "know your customer" rule, 2 1 however, the scope of private relief under rule 405, as presently recognized by the courts, will not adequately protect the investing public.
CONCLUSION

This Comment has investigated and evaluated the five primary
remedies currently available under both state and federal law against
customer fraud perpetrated through NYSE brokerage firms: SEC
enforcement and disciplinary controls over the New York Stock Exchange and its members; NYSE enforcement of its own rules; remedies under Article Eight of the Uniform Commercial Code for the
owner of misappropriated securities; civil liability under rule l0b-5;
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See
See
See
See
See

notes 229, 231 supra and accompanying text.
notes 234, 243, 250 supra and accompanying text.
note 255 supra and accompanying text.
notes 234, 243, 250 supra and accompanying text.
notes 62, 63 supra.
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and the private cause of action under the Exchange Act for violation
of NYSE rule 405. Because of administrative problems in detecting broker violations, enforcement problems created by the reluctance of both agencies to impose the expulsion and suspension sanctions against NYSE members and member firms, and the lack of
compensatory relief to injured parties, the enforcement and disciplinary controls of the SEC and NYSE are not sufficiently effective
to prevent customers' fraud or to compensate the injured owners of
misappropriated securities or funds. 262 It appears, therefore, that
the adequate protection of the investing public against customer
fraud can be assured only through the imposition of some form of
civil liability on the broker.
The primary civil remedies under state negotiable instrument
law (Article Eight of the UCC and common law conversion) provide some relief for the owner of misappropriated securities used by
broker's fraudulent customers, but only in situations where the securities are not indorsed in blank or are otherwise in bearer form.26 3
The UCC, furthermore, provides no relief for the injured owner
whose funds are embezzled and used to procure securities through
an NYSE broker. Finally, no state other than New York appears to
have squarely incorporated the requirements of rule 405 judicially
into the broker's defenses under Article Eight of the UCC, and thus
it is not certain that the UCC will provide adequate relief for
noncompliance with the "know your customer" rule even in those
264
transactions to which the UCC is applicable.
Civil relief under rule lOb-5 ostensibly offers the injured owner
of misappropriated securities or funds an attractive access to the federal court system for the purpose of redressing customer fraud.
Yet due to the scienter requirement, recovery is limited to those
situations in which the broker dealing with the public has actual
knowledge or reckless disregard of a customer's fraudulent
scheme. 265 Thus, the private cause of action for damages under
rule lOb-5 will not vindicate the type of "due diligence" customer
262. See notes 52-55, 86-88 supra and accompanying text.
263. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [19691970 Transfer Binder] CCH Fa. SEc. L. REP.
93,748, at 99,273 (N.D. Ill.
1970); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 234
N.E.2d 230, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1967), modified on other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 672,
238 N.E.2d 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968). See notes 76-81, 134-35 supra and
accompanying text.
264. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
265. See notes 159-71 supra and accompanying text.
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investigation duties envisioned by rule 405 as necessary for the prevention of customer fraud.
Since a substantial portion of customer fraud arguably is perpetrated through brokers who are merely negligent in failing to investigate customers, there emerges a genuine need for a remedy
that will redress negligent violations of the "know your customer"
rule. -86 The most potentially viable remedy for this purpose is the
private cause of action under the Exchange Act for violations of
rule 405 itself. To date, however, this remedy has a controversial
status and exists as a certainty only where the rule violation is
"tantamount to fraud." Although the judiciary is presently faced
with another opportunity to examine the scope of this implied cause
of action under rule 405,261 it is questionable, under present judicial
construction, whether this remedy accords compensatory relief for
the negligent misconduct of brokers.
The federalization of rule 405 and the broadening of implied
civil relief thereunder to encompass the full scope of the rule, including its "due diligence" investigation duties, cannot be accomplished free and clear of serious problems. There is serious question,
first of all, whether Congress ever intended such complete federalization of any self-regulatory exchange rule.268 Second, there
are no clear standards for resolving which exchange rules and
which violations thereof are designed for the protection of investors
and constitute an integral part of SEC regulation, so as to be actionable in a federal court.269 There is a problem, furthermore, in
federalizing the full scope of rule 405 when much of the rule may
have been designed originally for the "housekeeping" function of
protecting brokerage firm capital from losses and thus not for the
purpose of constituting an integral part of the SEC, investor-pro266. See notes 13-38 supra and accompanying text; cf. Bucklo 595, stating:
The second area in which there is a valid argument for application of a
negligence standard is in those cases where the nature of a defendant's
business relationship with investors imposes a special duty to act not only
with honesty but with care. Accountants and broker-dealers, for example,
hold themselves out as having special competence.
267. See notes 252-56 supra and accompanying text.
268. See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); McMaster Hutchinson & Co. v. Rothschild & Co,,
CCH FrD. SEC. L. REP. 93,541 (N.D. 111. 1972); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEC. L. REP.
1 93,748 (N.D. IIl. 1970).
269. See note 214 supra and accompanying text. But see Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
-(1966).
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tection regulatory scheme.27 Finally, stock exchanges might prove
reluctant to promulgate rules for the protection of investors if there
will be a presumption of civil liability in the event of their breach.
Despite these drawbacks, however, the Seventh Circuit, the only
federal circuit court of appeals to address the issue of implied liability of brokers under rule 405, has interpreted the "know your
customer" rule as an "investor-protection" rule which will support a private cause of action, at least for violations which constitute an integral part of the SEC regulatory scheme. Due to the
widespread nature of the problem of customers' fraud in the national securities markets and the substantial limitations inherent in
alternative remedies, it is perhaps time for the judiciary to move
forward from Buttrey towards a federalization of rule 405's due diligence duties for brokers. An expansive judicial recognition of a
private cause of action to enforce the full scope of rule 405, including negligent violations, appears to be the most effective means for
protecting the investing public from customers' fraud.
270. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.

